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The ten countries joining the European Union in
May 2004 are intensively discussing issues
related to their future participation in ERM II
and the subsequent adoption of the euro. Many
of them have tabled concrete strategies for
further monetary integration within the EU,
elaborating in particular on the intended timing
of ERM II entry and euro adoption. In some
cases strategies announced in 2001 or 2002
have recently been modified or refined. Most
countries appear to be opting for a relatively
short participation in ERM II. However, some
countries have shifted their preferred euro
adoption dates backward by one or two years,
compared with their original plans, which in
turn implies that ERM II entry is in these cases
targeted only some time after EU accession.
This paper presents an analytical review of
the acceding countries’ strategies towards
further monetary integration, with the aim of
contributing to the ongoing dialogue with the
acceding countries’ central banks. In particular,
the paper aims at examining the economic
rationale of the strategies declared by most
acceding countries so that also potential risks
involved can be identified. It is worth noting
that this paper does not explore in much detail
the benefits of euro adoption per se, as it takes
the institutional framework as given, which
foresees the introduction of the single currency
in the acceding countries at some future point
(with no opt-out clauses). Rather, the paper
focuses on the timing of euro adoption, i.e. on
the economic merits and risks of an early
adoption of the euro compared with those of
introducing the euro at a later stage, in each of
the country cases under consideration.
The paper should not be seen as a form of
convergence assessment, but rather as a
conceptual framework to study the acceding
countries’ declared strategies. Judgements are
tentative and may change over time, as new
information becomes available and additionally
as the acceding countries’ strategies continue to
evolve.
While at the current juncture the policy focus
lies on ERM II issues, the analysis needs to be
seen in light of the countries’ medium to longer-
term policy plans up to the adoption of the euro,
as these plans set the context for the timing and
the possible modalities of ERM II participation.
For countries that can realistically aim at
introducing the euro in the medium term, issues
related to ERM II participation may be quite
different than the issues facing countries for
which the prospect of euro adoption is more
remote. Indeed, a full examination of the
consistency of ERM II strategies has to extend
to the question of whether these strategies are in
line with the eventual endpoint of monetary
integration. In a way, one could therefore see
the optimal policy planning as being solved
backwards. This paper, however, takes a
more chronological approach, following the
sequence outlined in the Treaty, and reviews
first the considerations underlying ERM II
participation, and then turns to issues related to
full monetary integration in the euro area.
Almost all of the ten acceding countries
originally declared their intention to adopt the
euro a few years after EU entry; since then,
some have more recently moved towards a
somewhat more extended timeline. Following
the procedures laid down in the Treaty, some
aim at introducing the euro at the beginning of
2007 (or perhaps already in the later part of
2006), subsequent to a two-year period within
ERM II starting around mid-2004 and a positive
convergence assessment thereafter. The main
motives for the intended early adoption of the
euro are to advance economic and financial
integration with the euro area, to anchor
domestic policies and to lower risk premia,
thereby fostering economic growth and real
1 Special contributions by Ralph Süppel during his stay at the ECB are
gratefully acknowledged, together with contributions by Iikka Korhonen
(from the Bank of Finland) and Cezary Wojcik, who provided updated
empirical results, and Stefan Wredenborg, who helped with the
quantitative research.
2 This paper has been discussed extensively in the ECB/ESCB and has
benefited from substantive comments in the process, which are gratefully
acknowledged. The authors would like to thank in particular Tommaso
Padoa-Schioppa, Pierre van der Haegen, members of the International
Relations Committee and representatives of the acceding countries’
central  banks for their helpful suggestions. It is worth recalling that the
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the ECB.
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INTRODUCTION
convergence. Those countries that have recently
begun to envisage a somewhat longer process
before adopting the euro, on the other hand,
mostly refer to 2008, 2009 or 2010 as target
years for joining the euro area.
This paper reviews the economic considerations
surrounding entry into ERM II for the acceding
countries as well as those relating to the
adoption of the euro. Wherever necessary and
appropriate, the paper differentiates among
acceding countries, given the significant degree
of diversity among them. The considerations of
this paper assume that the main interest of the
ECB is in ensuring an enlargement process that
is smooth and follows Treaty procedures,
thereby protecting the credibility of the ERM II
mechanism as well as the stability of the euro
area. This implies that the timing for ERM II
entry and euro adoption need to be broadly
appropriate and based on economic logic.
The analysis of the paper is necessarily
tentative, as the underlying theory, notably on
optimum currency areas (OCA) and the choice
of exchange rate regimes, provides only limited
guidance. Indeed, both the costs and benefits of
monetary union – let alone their balance and
aspects related to timing – are difficult to
quantify. Moreover, the time horizon of
available data is short and is influenced by
several important shocks that the central and
eastern European economies have experienced
in recent years. Still, the paper may be useful in
clarifying some of the issues at stake and in
providing a conceptual framework of how to
analyse and review the acceding countries’
strategies towards ERM II and the euro.
The paper is organised as follows. Part 1
explores the issues related to ERM II. It recalls
the main views of the acceding countries and the
ECB/Eurosystem on the Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and examines the constraints on
exchange rate policies within ERM II, together
with the likely changes in de facto exchange rate
policy for individual countries. Part 2 analyses
issues related to a future adoption of the euro,
with a particular focus on aspects that are
relevant for timing. It deliberately looks beyond
considerations relating to the Maastricht
criteria, and includes standard OCA indicators
as well as a discussion of catching-up-
related issues, focusing in particular on
the implications of structural differences in
economic dynamics. Some tentative conclusions
are offered at the end of the paper.6
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This section reviews some of the economic
issues related to the acceding countries’
participation in ERM II. It consists of three
parts: an overview of the current policy
statements regarding ERM II of both the
acceding countries and the Eurosystem; a short
review of the main features of ERM II, as set
out in the Resolution by the European Council;
and an exploration of the economic issues
related to participation in ERM II.
I.1 ACCEDING COUNTRIES’ AND
ECB/EUROSYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
1.1.1 ACCEDING COUNTRIES’ PERSPECTIVE
Most acceding countries regard ERM II as an
institutional requirement for the adoption of the
euro that cannot be avoided, but whose
appropriateness as an exchange rate policy
framework is questionable. Overall, they
perceive ERM II as a “waiting room” that offers
at best little value-added and may even entail
certain risks. In their policy statements, many
acceding countries have suggested that their
participation in ERM II will be characterised by
the following features:
– The duration of participation will be limited
to only two years.3
– Actual exchange rate management shall lean
towards a narrow band from the very
beginning of participation. The reason for
this is that the relevant interpretation of the
Maastricht criterion is seen as pointing to the
maintenance of the exchange rate “close to
the central rates”, which in turn is interpreted
as de facto meaning a narrower (possibly
±2.25%) range, with perhaps some
flexibility upward but not downward.4
– The central rate should be chosen so that it
facilitates the kind of exchange rate
management described before, and should
ideally be the future conversion rate.
1 THE ROLE OF ERM II
The rationale for such an interpretation is
based on a negative assessment of ERM II in the
following four main policy areas: (i) discipline,
(ii) credibility, (iii) adjustability, and
(iv) multilateralism.
– Discipline: Acceding countries value the
disciplinary impact of ambitious deadlines
for euro adoption on macroeconomic and
structural policies, but see little disciplinary
effect arising from ERM II. Moreover, in
terms of fiscal policy, they often refer to the
disciplinary impact of the multilateral
surveillance exercise that will be applied
upon EU accession in any case. Any
disciplinary impact in addition to the
Maastricht criteria for euro adoption and the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is
considered negligible.
– Credibility: Acceding countries regard
ERM II as an intermediate exchange rate
regime, subject to risks of speculative
attacks. The ERM crisis in 1992/93 and the
recent experience of Hungary, which faced a
policy dilemma between its inflation target
and its exchange rate objective, are seen as
examples of these risks. In addition, the
current monetary arrangements – ranging
from currency boards arrangements (CBAs)
to free floats with inflation targeting – are
generally seen as credible overall, as
evidenced in mostly low inflation rates,
declining policy interest rates and well-
entrenched expectations of low inflation.
Some officials argue that either their country
is ready to adopt the euro, in which case
ERM II is not needed as the exchange rate
should be stable anyway, or it is not, in
which case ERM II is not a sufficiently safe
framework for exchange rate and
macroeconomic policy management.
3 Hungary intends to participate in ERM II for a somewhat longer time
period (see also Box 1).
4 Poland would prefer to make use of the standard fluctuation band
while participating in ERM II (see Box 1).7
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SELECTED STATEMENTS BY ACCEDING COUNTRIES ON ERM II (EXTRACTS)
Cyprus “It is envisaged that the current ERM II-type exchange rate framework
shall continue to be in place until the eventual adoption of the euro.” The
intention of the authorities in Cyprus is “an early participation in the ERM II
mechanism” which derives from “the authorities’ aim to join the euro zone
as early as possible after accession.” Pre-accession Economic Programme
(PEP) 2003.
Czech Rep. “The mere participation of a currency in [the] ERM II regime does not eliminate
monetary turbulence (unlike irreversible fixation of the exchange rate within the
framework of a monetary union). Therefore the participation in ERM II can be
perceived only as a prerequisite for joining the euro zone and the central bank
does not consider a longer-than-necessary stay in ERM II to be desirable. In line
with this view the Czech Republic should enter the ERM II only after conditions
have been created that will enable it to introduce the euro at the time of the
assessment of the exchange-rate criterion (two years after joining the ERM II).
In view of the development of the general government deficit expected within the
framework of proposed public finance reform, the koruna would therefore
remain outside [the] ERM II system, even for some time after the accession of
the Czech Republic to the EU.” PEP 2003.
Estonia “Estonia will present an application to join the ERM II exchange rate
mechanism immediately after EU accession in 2004… Estonia wants to keep a
fixed exchange rate and the financial framework supporting the currency board
system up to euro area accession and as a part of the ERM II framework,
taking it as a unilaterally binding obligation to hold exchange rate stability.”
PEP 2003.
Hungary “The Government, in concert with the central bank, has expressed its
commitment to joining the ERM II… as soon as possible after we become [a]
Member State of the EU. Unlike in the case of the vast majority of accession
countries, this exchange rate mechanism is very similar to the Hungarian
exchange rate system, which makes ERM II entry easier. Participation in ERM II
has substantial benefits while it has no major risks. Its benefits include greater
credibility and the fact that, as no unilateral decision can be taken in ERM II, the
risk premium expected by foreign investors because the exchange rate policy
decisions of a given country, in our case Hungary, are not fully predictable, will
be reduced significantly.” PEP 2003.
Latvia “Upon reaching a mutual agreement between the Bank of Latvia and all involved
EU institutions, the Bank of Latvia plans that Latvia will join ERM II together
with changing the currency peg on 1st January 2005… Taking into account the
requirement in the area of meeting the currency stability criterion and the so far
successful practice, the Bank of Latvia has no plans for using the exchange rate8
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fluctuation limitation boundaries in the amount of ±15% of the central parity…
fully, but, in case of necessity, by using unilateral interventions, intends to limit
the lat fluctuations against the euro to a narrower fluctuation corridor within
the framework of ERM II.” PEP 2003.
Lithuania “It is purposeful to join the ERM II, at the same keeping all the features of the
current exchange rate system.” PEP 2003. “We will propose to the government
to jointly start talks on accession to ERM II… the earliest possible date for
acceding to ERM II could be 1st May 2004, when Lithuania will join the bloc. It
may also happen a little later, for instance, on 1st July in the coming year… While
acceding to ERM II, Lithuania will seek to keep the current litas-euro rate but
fluctuation margins will be zero, i.e. there will be no fluctuations in the litas rate
with respect to the euro.” Governor Sarkinas, May 2003.
Malta “It would be appropriate to [apply] soon after membership next May to
participate in the ERM II by early 2005.” Minister Dalli, November 2003.
Poland “Poland should join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) so soon as
possible if only the macroeconomic conditions make it possible. During a two-
year participation in the ERM II the zloty should be allowed to deviate from the
central parity within a standard fluctuation band (±15%).” PEP 2003.
Slovakia “The time spent inside the ERM II should be as short as possible ... the country
could join the ERM II in 2005.” Strategy of the Slovak Republic for Adoption
of the Euro, June 2003.
Slovenia “Slovenia intends to enter into the ERM II in the first half of 2005.” PEP 2003.
Subsequently, in November 2003, the Slovenian government and the central bank
agreed on a joint monetary integration strategy according to which Slovenia
would intend to join ERM II “by the end of 2004”.
– Adjustability: Acceding countries believe that
the standard fluctuation band of ±15%, plus
the general possibility of upward realignments,
might signal that the exchange rate could
appreciate by as much as 15% or even more
and thereby contribute to higher exchange rate
volatility. Moreover, efforts to stabilise the
exchange rate within the band could cause
speculative attacks and thus lead to excessive
exchange rate volatility rather than stability.
– Multilateralism: Acceding countries are
uncertain about the involvement of the ECB
with respect to coordinated intra-marginal
interventions and even interventions at the
margin. As a result, they fear higher foreign
exchange market uncertainty and
speculation.
1.1.2 THE EUROSYSTEM POSITION
The Eurosystem position regarding ERM II is
set out in the “Policy position of the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank on
exchange rate issues relating to the acceding
countries”, published on 18 December 2003.5
This document builds on earlier statements
5 See http://www.ecb.int (‘Press release’ section).9
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made by the Eurosystem on ERM II. Box 2
contains a selection of these statements. In its
communication, the Eurosystem put forward the
view that ERM II should be seen as a useful
regime in its own right, arguing that a number
of policy challenges faced in the run-up to the
euro may well be tackled best within that
framework.
The Eurosystem has defended the rationale for
ERM II membership by referring to arguments
that can be seen in the same four categories as
those of acceding countries, albeit with a
positive assessment of the value of ERM II.
– Discipline: By requiring consistent
economic policies, ERM II could help in
providing a more stable macroeconomic
environment and could moreover act as a
catalyst for structural reforms.
– Credibility: ERM II, with its announced
central parity, would provide guidance to
participants in foreign exchange markets,
and may thereby contribute to greater
exchange rate stability. Moreover, by
anchoring inflation expectations and
reducing exchange rate volatility, ERM II
may also contribute to lowering the level and
volatility of inflation. Unlike other
intermediate regimes, ERM II entails
ultimate exit into the euro area, thus making
the system more resilient than other
alternative exchange rate regimes.
– Adjustability: The standard fluctuation band
would leave sufficient room to adjust to
asymmetric shocks and structural changes in
the economy. Moreover, in the event that the
catching-up process is faster than expected, a
revaluation of the central rate would be
possible.
– Multilateralism: The multilateral character of
ERM II would be a feature that would
enhance the credibility of the framework, as
all parties would be engaged in monitoring
economic and policy developments, and
assessing market reactions and possibly
ultimately co-ordinating actions, if required.
The position of December 2003 recalls the dual
role of ERM II, which acts as an arrangement
for managing exchange rates between the
currencies of Member States participating in the
mechanism and the euro, while at the same time
playing a role in the convergence criteria for
joining the euro. It lays out the main features
of the mechanism (see also Section 1.2 below)
and, in doing so, maintains that the standard
fluctuation band foreseen in ERM II is
appropriate for Member States that are engaging
in a convergence process. The position paper
then turns to the issues related to entry into
ERM II. A key element in this context is that to
ensure smooth participation in the mechanism,
major policy adjustments – for example with
regard to price liberalisation and fiscal policy –
have to be undertaken prior to participation in
the mechanism, and a credible fiscal
consolidation path needs to be followed. This
notwithstanding, entry into ERM II is not
subject to a set of pre-established criteria.
Regarding the length of ERM II participation,
the document recalls the minimum period of
ERM II membership of two years prior to the
convergence assessment, highlighting that the
length of participation in ERM II should be
assessed in terms of what is most helpful to
accompany the convergence process, rather than
in terms of the required minimum period. As
acceding countries differ greatly in their
economic structures, exchange rates and
monetary regimes, as well as in the degree of
nominal and real convergence already achieved,
no single path towards ERM II can be identified
and recommended. For some new Member
States, it might be appropriate to consider
application for ERM II participation only after a
further degree of convergence has been
achieved. This is particularly advisable when an
early rigidity in the exchange rate could
precipitate disorderly realignments with
potentially disruptive economic consequences,
including for the credibility of the mechanism10
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as a whole. For other new Member States that
have implemented significant structural reforms
and have shown the ability to advance
convergence through sound economic policies
and an exchange rate regime that is in principle
compatible with ERM II, entry into the
mechanism can take place soon after accession,
provided that there is mutual agreement on the
central parity. The position of December 2003
also maintains that, in certain cases, new
Member States may consider it desirable to
envisage a longer stay in ERM II while further
convergence takes place.
The position paper ends with a section on the
adoption of the euro, which includes an
explanation of how the exchange rate stability
criterion has been and will continue to be
applied. The criterion refers to participation in
ERM II for a period of at least two years prior
to the convergence assessment without severe
tensions, in particular without devaluing
against the euro. The assessment of exchange
rate stability against the euro will focus on the
exchange rate being close to the central rate,
while also taking into account factors that may
have led to an appreciation, in line with what
was done in the past. In this respect, the width
of the fluctuation band within ERM II shall not
prejudge the assessment of the exchange rate
stability criterion. Finally, the position paper
describes how the ECB addresses the issue of
the absence of “severe tensions”.11
ECB





SELECTED STATEMENTS BY THE EUROSYSTEM ON ERM II (IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)
“Achieving a high degree of nominal convergence and a significant degree of ‘institutional’
convergence is essential for, first, smooth participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM II) and, later on, successful membership in the euro area.” L. Papademos, Vienna,
November 2003.
“The point [in time] of joining ERM II… should be consistent with having achieved a sufficient
level of nominal and real convergence… An important ingredient of any monetary policy strategy
after EU accession is to guide the choice of when to enter ERM II and later EMU. Membership
of EU does not necessarily mean immediate entry in ERM II, although this may be an option for
some acceding countries… For the participation in ERM II to be successful, however, it is
crucial that the real and nominal convergence processes have advanced sufficiently and that
economic policies and structures are consistent with this regime. It follows that premature
rigidity of the exchange rate could precipitate disorderly realignments with disruptive
economic consequences, including the credibility of the mechanism.” G. Tumpel-Gugerell,
Frankfurt am Main, November 2003.
“Participation in ERM II may contribute to anchor expectations and support the
implementation of sound macroeconomic and structural policies, thus fostering real and
nominal convergence. However, participation in ERM II must be compatible with all other
elements of a country’s macroeconomic policy framework, in particular with the monetary,
fiscal and structural policies.” G. Tumpel-Gugerell, Frankfurt am Main, October 2003.
“The principal function of the ERM is to act as an instrument for consolidating economic
policies designed to promote stability and convergence, both nominal and real. Membership of
ERM II is itself a criterion for membership of Monetary Union, and should last for at least two
years. There is also a qualitative requirement: this minimum period of membership must be
completed without excessive tensions arising and without the currency concerned being
devalued [during this period] by the participating country. ERM II is often said to play a dual
role since it acts as an instrument of convergence and as a membership criterion in its own
right… ERM II must not be seen as an uncomfortable two-year waiting room for accession
countries, but instead as a mechanism that combines compromise and flexibility and that
facilitates stability and adaptation to a new environment.” E. Domingo Solans, Berlin,
October 2003.
“First of all, ERM II is a voluntary arrangement, which means it can be joined at any time
following accession … Second, ERM II is an exchange rate arrangement with fixed but
adjustable central parities and a ‘normal’ fluctuation band of ±15 % … which can help anchor
the nominal exchange rate and, crucially, expectations. At the same time, it also leaves some
room to accommodate upward pressure on the exchange rate... These phenomena have to be
taken into account when deciding the modalities of ERM participation and … in the assessment
of exchange rate stability … Third, ERM II is a multilateral exchange rate arrangement.
Decisions concerning central rates and fluctuation bands will be taken on a case-by-case basis
and by mutual agreement of all the parties involved, including the ECB … If inconsistent national
policies threaten to make the central parity unsustainable, the parties involved will first urge12
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the country concerned to mend its ways, to adjust its policies. If this is not feasible, a
realignment can be negotiated.” L. Papademos, Dublin, March 2003.
“It is important that any decision to join ERM II is consistent with an adequate level of nominal
and real convergence with the euro area … Once in ERM II, countries will be expected to
continue their convergence process until the sustainable achievement of the Maastricht criteria
… For some countries the benefits of staying longer in ERM II could more than offset the
opportunity costs …Optimally choosing the timing of adoption of the euro also implies reducing
the differences in per capita income levels.” O. Issing, Budapest, February 2003.
“Upon accession to the EU, countries are expected to intensify preparations for full
participation in EMU. This process will include, at some point, joining the exchange rate
mechanism (ERM II) … In this context, it was discussed in particular how to use ERM II not
simply as a ‘waiting room’ before joining the euro, but as a meaningful framework to deal with
the challenges related to further nominal and real convergence. Looking ahead, many
accession countries expressed an interest in joining ERM II upon or soon after EU entry. At the
same time, it was also stressed that the optimal time to join the mechanism and eventually adopt
the euro could vary from country to country.” Press release, Genval Seminar on the EU
accession process, December 2002.
“ERM II will indeed be a framework that provides both stability and flexibility – a combination
that is likely to be beneficial for many of the current accession countries in their real and
nominal convergence process… ERM II should not be seen as a mere waiting room prior to the
adoption of the euro… Instead, it should be regarded as a meaningful and flexible framework for
combining nominal and real convergence, and for tackling the challenges faced by the
accession countries in the run-up to the adoption of the euro… In addition, ERM II may provide
an appropriate framework to avoid major misalignments when choosing the conversion rates
to the euro.” T. Padoa-Schioppa, Vienna, November 2002.
“ERM II membership needs neither to happen immediately after EU accession in all cases, nor
to be limited to only two years, which is the minimum for adoption of the euro. It would be
misleading to consider ERM II as a mere waiting room before the euro. On the very contrary,
ERM II would allow countries to retain some limited exchange rate flexibility during the
catching-up process.” J.-C. Trichet, Vienna, June 2002.
“ERM II membership does not need to happen immediately after EU accession in all cases, nor
does ERM II membership need to be limited to only two years, which is the minimum for
adoption of the euro. A longer membership of ERM II may, in some cases, be helpful since it
would allow countries to retain the exchange rate as an instrumental policy variable during the
catching-up process.” W. Duisenberg, Frankfurt, November 2001.13
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1.2 RATIONALE AND FEATURES OF ERM II
To the extent that it is part of the Treaty
obligations to adopt the euro, ERM II
membership also imposes a legal requirement
on Member States with a derogation. The
exchange rate mechanism itself is defined in the
“Resolution of the European Council on the
establishment of an exchange rate mechanism in
the third stage of the EMU” (hereafter, the
Resolution).6 The Resolution states:
– The main objective of ERM II is to support a
stable economic environment needed for the
good functioning of the single market. In
particular, real exchange rate misalignments
and excessive nominal exchange rate
fluctuations between the euro and other EU
currencies must be avoided. ERM II is
expected to provide Member States outside
the euro area with a reference for their
conduct of sound economic policies,
particularly in the monetary field, designed
to foster real convergence and support their
efforts to adopt the euro, and to help protect
participants from unwarranted pressures in
foreign exchange markets.
– The main features of ERM II include: (i) a
central rate against the euro; (ii) a standard
fluctuation band of ±15% around the central
rate; (iii) obligatory interventions at the
margins, which are in principle automatic
and unlimited; and (iv) availability for very
short-term financing. The Resolution
emphasises, however, that the ECB and the
participating NCBs “could suspend
intervention, if this were to conflict with
their primary objective.” Such a decision to
suspend intervention would “take due
account of all relevant factors and in
particular of the need to maintain price
stability and the credible functioning of the
exchange rate mechanism.”
– Participation in the exchange rate mechanism
will be voluntary for the Member States
outside the euro area. Nevertheless, Member
States with a derogation can be expected to
join the mechanism, while a Member State
which does not participate from the outset in
the exchange rate mechanism may do so at a
later date. The Resolution makes no mention
of entry conditions and, although a common
accord on the central parity and fluctuation
bands needs to be reached, provides no
grounds for a refusal of the application.
However,  “all parties to the mutual
agreement, including the ECB, have the right
to initiate a confidential procedure aimed at
reconsidering central rates”.
As follows from the above, ERM II is meant to
help participating Member States orient their
policies to stability and to foster convergence.
Furthermore, participation in ERM II plays a
role in the convergence criteria for joining the
euro, because participation in it for a period of
at least two years without severe tensions and
without devaluing at the country’s own
initiative is one of the preconditions for joining
the euro. This dual role of ERM II will have
implications for the exchange rate policies of
acceding countries upon ERM II entry.
Whether these two purposes can be achieved
simultaneously or whether they imply a
sequence, with a period in which the
stabilisation role of ERM II is prevalent,
followed by a convergence test period, will
depend on country-specific characteristics and
will, therefore, vary among acceding countries.
Section 1.3 explores the risks associated with
joining ERM II right upon EU accession, while
Part 2 deals with issues that are relevant for the
timing of euro adoption, thereby delineating
possible endpoints of ERM II participation.
Indeed, if the timing of ERM II is not carefully
assessed, the management of exchange rate
policy may be complicated and even subject to
significant risks. In particular, in some
acceding countries, nominal and real interest
rates are still higher than in the euro area. In
combination with tightly managed exchange
6 Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange
rate mechanism in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union,
Amsterdam 16 June 1997.14
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rates, this could trigger portfolio inflows linked
to so-called convergence trades in financial
markets, particularly in the context of an
ERM II participation with very small exchange
rate movements which limit the potential losses
of speculative attacks. On the other hand,
adjusting interest rates too early to euro area
levels may run counter to disinflation progress
and domestic stabilisation. Containing
exchange rate appreciation in a context of
persisting capital inflows through interventions
would, if not sterilised, risk the prospect of
disinflation or, if sterilised, be fairly ineffective
and entail potentially significant sterilisation
costs. Finally, the substantial fiscal adjustments
envisaged in some of the larger acceding
countries also pose severe risks to the
management of monetary and exchange rate
policies. In particular, as privatisation receipts
are envisaged to decline, the authorities may
increasingly need to resort to debt issuance to
finance fiscal deficits, adding further pressure
on capital inflows and complicating the
management of monetary policy.7
As for the convergence test regarding the
fulfilment of the exchange rate criterion in the
two years before the convergence assessment, a
key reference for exchange rate management is
the Informal Ecofin document on “Acceding
countries and the ERM II” adopted on 5 April
2003. In line with the ECB’s position
mentioned above, this document states: “The
assessment of the fulfilment of the Maastricht
convergence criteria and the procedures to be
followed for the introduction of the euro will
ensure equal treatment between future Member
States and the current participants in the euro
area. A minimum stay of two years in the
mechanism prior to the convergence assessment
without severe tensions is expected. Moreover,
the assessment of exchange rate stability
against the euro will focus on the exchange rate
being close to the central rate, while also taking
into account factors that may have led to an
appreciation, in line with what was done in the
past” (emphasis added). This would focus on
the implementation of sound monetary and
fiscal policies, which nevertheless may lead to
an appreciation of the exchange rate that is
intrinsic to the catching-up process. Such
developments would also mirror what has been
done in the past in the cases of Ireland and
Greece.
1.3 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ERM II
As it is a legal text, the Resolution does not
assess the economic rationale for ERM II
membership. However, in order to qualify
further the acceding countries’ participation in
ERM II, the economic implications of ERM II
membership need to be reviewed. This section
aims at reviewing some of the main economic
considerations that arise in this context.
1.3.1 CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
Several of the acceding countries have already
essentially renounced an independent monetary
policy, since they have traditionally maintained
exchange rate strategies based on external
anchors, mostly through hard pegs (see Table 1
and also Chart 1 on pp. 16-17):
– The Cyprus pound has been unilaterally
pegged, with a ±2.25% fluctuation band, to
the ECU since June 1992 and to the euro
since 1 January 1999, with the same central
parity as previously adopted for the ECU.
On 1 January 2001 wider bands of ±15%
were introduced, in order to absorb any
shocks from potentially destabilising capital
movements and to deter speculative capital
flows. At the same time, the narrower
“softer” bands of ±2.25% were temporarily
maintained to help anchor prices and
expectations. The narrower bands were
definitively abolished on 13 August 2001,
leaving only the ±15% margins currently in
place.
7 Alternatively, if the acceding countries were to resort to issuing short-term
debt denominated in domestic currency, which is traditionally absorbed by
players in the domestic market, this might have a crowding-out effect on
private investment.15
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– Estonia has followed a currency board
arrangement since 1992. Originally pegged to
the Deutsche Mark, the Estonian kroon was re-
pegged to the euro on 1 January 1999.
– Since February 1994, Latvia has followed a
de facto peg to the Special Drawing Right
(SDR), which was officially formalised in
1997. The weight of the euro in the SDR
currently stands at around 35%.
– Lithuania has followed a currency board
arrangement since April 1994. Although
originally pegged to the US dollar, the
currency board of the litas was re-pegged to
the euro in February 2002.
– Malta has followed a currency basket peg
since 1971. The weight of the euro in the
currency basket has been regularly revised to
reflect the trade relations of the Maltese
economy, and currently stands at 70%.
– Since 1992, the Slovenian tolar has, for most
of this period, been on a moderate and
smooth depreciation trend against the
Deutsche Mark and, since 1 January 1999,
against the euro.
Exchange rate strategy 1) Currency Features
Cyprus Peg to the euro, with Cyprus  pound The Cyprus pound has de facto fluctuated within a narrow range
± 15% fluctuation bands
Czech Republic Managed float Czech koruna Inflation targeting: 2%-4% by end-2005
Estonia Currency board to the euro Estonian kroon Introduced in 1992
Hungary Peg to the euro, with Hungarian forint Exchange rate regime combined with inflation targeting: max. 4.5%
±15% fluctuation bands by end-2003, 5.5% by end-2004  and 3%-5% by end-2005
Latvia Peg to the SDR Latvian lat Fluctuation band ±1%
(euro weight 35%)
Lithuania Currency board to the euro Lithuanian litas Introduced in 1994; re-pegged from the US dollar to the euro in
February 2002
Malta Peg to a basket Maltese lira Currency basket (euro (70%), US dollar, pound sterling)
Poland Free float Polish zloty Inflation targeting: 2%-4% by end-2003; 1.5%-3.5% from 2004 onwards
Slovakia Managed float Slovak koruna Hybrid strategy, combined with implicit inflation targeting
 Slovenia Exchange rates within Slovenian tolar Two-pillar strategy monitoring monetary, real,  external and financial
crawling bands 2) indicators
Sources: IMF and ECB.
1) Based on the IMF De Facto Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy as of 30 June 2003.
2) The regime operating de facto in the country differs from its de jure regime, which is a managed float.
Table 1 Exchange rate strategies currently followed by the acceding countries
(IMF classification)
Overall, this strategy has served most small and
very small acceding countries well, as it has
supported them in significantly advancing
economic convergence in recent years. In most
cases, inflation and nominal interest rates stand
at around levels similar to those in the euro area,
while fiscal accounts are presently in balance or
display relatively moderate deficits.8 However,
several small acceding countries are currently
registering high current account deficits, which
warrant continuous monitoring.
In the larger acceding countries, however, the
exchange rate seems to play a macroeconomic
role as a stabilisation tool, dampening to some
extent output variability. Therefore, in these
countries, maintaining some degree of monetary
policy independence and nominal exchange rate
flexibility may still be useful at the current stage
and possibly for some time to come. Indeed,
this policy option would be consistent with the
countries’ own monetary policy choices at
present, as the larger acceding countries have
8 The notable exceptions are Malta, with a projected budget deficit of 6.5%
of GDP in 2003; Cyprus, with a projected budget deficit of 6.0% in 2003;
and Slovenia, where HICP inflation stood at 5.6% in 2003. See Part B for
further details, as well as on the challenges in the fiscal field.16
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felt the need to grant their currencies increased
flexibility in recent years.
– The Czech Republic adopted its current
strategy, a free float combined with an
inflation targeting framework, in 1998. This
strategy was introduced with the aim of
providing a nominal anchor to monetary
policy, after the severe currency crisis of
1997 triggered the abandonment of the
koruna peg.9
– The Hungarian forint has moved away from
the crawling fluctuation band introduced in
March 1995, with the rate of the crawl being
reduced gradually and the band widened. In
May 2001, the crawl was abandoned and the
bands widened to ±15%. The choice of this
strategy was quite timely, as it coincided
with the liberalisation of short-term capital
flows. Moreover, it has been combined with
an inflation-targeting framework. More
recently, the central rate was devalued by
2.26% in June 2003.
– Poland follows a free float with an inflation-
targeting framework. Starting from a
currency basket peg introduced in 1991,
Poland has gradually allowed increasing








































































9 The koruna was fixed against a currency basket composed of DEM (65%)
and USD (35%), with a fluctuation band of ±0.5% from 1993 to February
1996 and of ±7.5% from February 1996 to May 1997.18
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crawling band, introduced in 1995, with the
rate of the crawl being gradually reduced and
the band widened so as to finally let the
currency float in 2000.
– Since the abandonment of the koruna peg in
1998, Slovakia has followed a managed float
with the euro as the main reference
currency.10 This exchange rate framework
has been combined with an implicit inflation-
targeting strategy.
These policy shifts towards greater exchange
rate flexibility have often been triggered by
stabilisation constraints involved in the
management of more rigid regimes.11 They have
also been facilitated by the rapid growth of
foreign exchange and local securities markets
resulting from capital account liberalisation,
high FDI inflows and growing domestic
banking sectors.
1.3.2 REGIME CHANGES IN VIEW OF ERM II
MEMBERSHIP
For most of the small and very small acceding
countries, ERM II membership may not
represent a de facto exchange rate regime shift.
Indeed, euro-based CBAs and hard pegs are
likely to be maintained within ERM II. First,
these countries lack a clear exit strategy from
their current regimes, other than the eventual
adoption of the euro, and second, countries
pursuing these strategies can, in principle, aim at
a ERM II central parity equal to the one in their
current exchange rate regime, plus a very narrow
fluctuation band unilaterally declared. Clearly,
the decision on the exchange rate parity will have
to be made in the multilateral setting foreseen in
the ERM II Resolution, and there will be a case-
by-case assessment of the compatibility of the
euro-based CBAs with ERM II and, later on,
with the adoption of the euro.
– The Cyprus pound has continued to trade
mostly within the range of the previously
existing narrow band vis-à-vis the euro
during the last two years, without making
effective use of the official ±15% fluctuation
band introduced in 2001.
– Conditional upon a positive assessment of
the sustainability of the currency board
arrangement and on a multilateral agreement
on the central rate as well, Estonia could
maintain its euro-based currency board as a
unilateral ex ante commitment to exchange
rate stability, augmenting the exchange rate
discipline embedded in ERM II.
– Latvia also has a tradition of nominal
exchange rate stability in the last decade.
Still, before joining ERM II, Latvia would
need to revise its current currency basket,
where the euro has, at current exchange
rates, a weight of only around 35%, and
make the euro the sole reference currency.12
– Conditional upon a positive assessment of
the sustainability of the currency board
arrangement and on a multilateral agreement
on the central rate as well, Lithuania could
maintain its euro-based currency board as a
unilateral ex ante commitment to exchange
rate stability, augmenting the exchange rate
discipline embedded in ERM II.
– Malta, which already operates a peg to a basket
with no fluctuation band, would need to revise
its current currency basket before joining ERM II
to make the euro the sole anchor currency
(currently the euro’s weight is at 70%).
– Given that the tolar has been on a gentle
depreciation path versus the euro, Slovenia
would have to shift from trend depreciation
to horizontal bands around a fixed parity in
order to join ERM II.
10 Between  1993 and 1998,  the Slovak  koruna was pegged to a currency
basket with one devaluation of 10% in mid-1993. The basket comprised
five currencies until mid-1994 and subsequently two currencies (60%
DEM and 40% USD). In 1996 the fluctuation band was widened from
±1.5% to ±7%. On 2 October 1998, the peg was abolished and replaced
by a managed float.
11 For instance, the currency crises in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in
1997 and 1998 respectively triggered the abandonment of the pegs.
12 The amount of euro in the SDR basket is EUR 0.426. Since the values of
the amounts of each currency in the basket fluctuate along with their
exchange rate, the share of the euro fluctuates as well.19
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Maintaining the main features of the above-
mentioned regimes until the adoption of the
euro may be justified on economic grounds.
First, to the extent that the current exchange rate
strategy is generally credible and compatible
with ERM II, it may not be desirable to advocate
a double regime shift before the adoption of the
euro, as the latter may raise uncertainty
regarding the country’s medium-term monetary
strategy, thereby distorting economic decisions
and risking those stabilisation gains already
accomplished. Second, the adoption of strong
external nominal anchors has served well these
very small open economies, with their
extremely thin foreign exchange markets,
enabling them to achieve macroeconomic
stabilisation, low inflation,13 and increasing
their access to global financial markets. The
achievements in terms of nominal convergence
have not come at the expense of output growth,
as structural reforms and macroeconomic
policies have been set broadly in line with the
maintenance of relatively rigid exchange rate
regimes. Although some countries have
witnessed some banking sector problems and
asset price bubbles in the past, associated with
sizeable current account deficits, these deficits
have typically been coupled with economic
restructuring and have been largely covered by
FDI flows. Finally, the existing regimes have
apparently enjoyed, by and large, credibility, as
reflected in stable and declining long-term
interest rates on assets denominated in domestic
currency and in the lack of an active use of
interest rate policy or pressure-related
interventions to defend the exchange rate (see
Chart 2).14
Unlike in the case of small and very small
acceding countries, which have adopted an
external nominal anchor and have, thus,
largely or entirely given up an independent
monetary policy, larger acceding countries
have maintained some monetary policy
independence, and the exchange rate has been
used increasingly flexibly in recent years.
Consequently, ERM II entry for these countries
would imply a regime change, in particular for
those countries which have not yet taken on
explicit exchange rate commitments. Experience
shows that it is of crucial importance to design
and manage regime changes in order to ensure a
smooth course of developments and avoid
welfare losses. This relates, in particular, to
choosing the right timing for moving to a new
regime, which requires special caution.
In principle, ERM II could well accommodate
the need for exchange rate flexibility in the
larger acceding countries. Provided that ERM II
entry is well-timed and that the entry parity is
chosen in line with underlying fundamentals,
the mechanism, with its ±15% fluctuation band,
leaves significant room for adjustments to
shocks and market developments. The
possibility of changing the central parity under
a multilateral agreement would add further
room for manoeuvre, for example, if the
real catching-up process is significantly faster
than expected and leads to sustained upward
pressure on the exchange rate. Hence, a full
use of the wide bands in ERM II and the
communication of the possibility of
realignments would, in principle, allow for a
considerable margin of de facto exchange rate
flexibility. An overly tight exchange rate
management “close to the central rates” as
currently envisaged by some of these countries
would, in all likelihood, be insufficient for the
exchange rate to play a useful role as an
adjustment tool.
The timing of ERM II entry also has to be
considered carefully with a view to the fiscal
position of a given country. This again
specifically relates to the larger acceding
countries, which are currently registering
substantial fiscal imbalances (see also Part 2). It
is obvious that ERM II participation would be
substantially facilitated by a sound medium-
term fiscal strategy, while at the same time also
underpinning the credibility of the fiscal
framework.
13 The exception is Slovenia in this group, where HICP inflation stood at
5.6% in  2003.
14 It should be noted, however, that in the absence of market liquidity, it
would take a serious misalignment for interest rates to be indicative of
such pressures.20
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Sources: ECB, Eurostat, IMF and national sources.
1) 5-year government bond yield (data series incomplete). 10-year government bond yield for Slovenia, 10-year kroon bank
loans to households for Estonia.
2) 3-month money market deposit rate.
3) Total international reserves of the central bank (excl. gold).21
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A closer assessment of individual country cases
suggests that early ERM II participation may
entail potential drawbacks for countries with a
free or lightly managed float and a functioning
and credible inflation targeting framework in
place. This is particularly true in cases where
such a policy set-up has been associated with
substantial exchange rate volatility in the past.
In principle, early entry into ERM II could be
seen as less problematic for countries that have
followed a unilateral “ERM II shadowing”
strategy or witnessed more limited nominal
exchange rate variability in recent years,
provided that ERM II participation is consistent
with the overall policy stance. In this respect, it
is noteworthy that fiscal consolidation appears
to be seriously off track in some of these
countries (see Section 2.3.8).
Finally, a general caveat has to be made. Even
if, at the current juncture, there may be no prima
facie evidence that the current exchange rate
regimes in some acceding countries have been
inappropriate from a stabilisation perspective or
have been subject to significant market
pressures, it would be premature to conclude
that the countries are ready for membership of
ERM II. Even if the current regimes may be
regarded as appropriate, the choice of the
central parity is an issue that needs careful
assessment, as decisions concerning central
rates are taken by mutual agreement of the
participating members in ERM II, including the
ECB. Moreover, even if only minor de facto
changes seem required in some small acceding
countries for participation in ERM II, a
potential misalignment in these countries is a
risk that cannot be ignored. More generally, the
absence of significant foreign exchange market
pressure in the past cannot be taken as implying
an absence of such pressure in the future. Risks
could, in principle, be relevant for all countries,
Jan.
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for example if EU entry were to prove a major
asymmetric shock to the economies of the
acceding countries, or if individual country-
specific developments were to derail the overall
monetary integration process. In such a
scenario, the fact that financial markets are
particularly small in some acceding countries
could become a disadvantage, as the critical
mass needed to trigger policy changes is also
relatively limited. Hence, if a major
misalignment threatening the stability of ERM
II occurs, all participating members, including
the ECB, have the right to initiate a procedure
aimed at reconsidering central rates.
Against this background, the requirement for a
two-year participation in ERM II, which acts as
a testing phase for the central rate as well as the
sustainability of convergence in general, would
help in identifying potential misalignments in
the central parity that have not been detected
before. Two main issues may have to be
considered in this respect: first, whether
nominal exchange rate stability itself has
aggravated stabilisation problems, reflected, for
example, in excessive current account deficits
or overheating. In this case, a change in the
central parity could be warranted. Second,
whether the growing size of the acceding
countries’ economies and their financial
markets, in combination with structural
differences compared to the anchor country,
may warrant greater exchange rate flexibility.
Although at the current juncture neither severe
stabilisation problems nor strong reasons for
greater exchange rate flexibility may seem
pressing, these issues, which are explored in
further detail in Part 2 below, should not be
ruled out entirely.23
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2.1 ACCEDING COUNTRIES’ PERSPECTIVE
Almost all acceding countries initially indicated
their intention to join the euro area as soon as
possible. More recently, however, some
acceding countries have begun to envisage a
somewhat longer process before adopting the
euro. Box 3 presents a short overview of the
timeframes that are currently featuring in the
acceding countries’ monetary integration
strategies with respect to euro adoption.15 From
a technical point of view, the earliest possible
date for an acceding country to adopt the euro
would be on 1 January 2007, assuming that euro
area membership continues to occur at the
beginning of a calendar year.16 In such a
scenario, the country would join the ERM II
mechanism soon after EU accession in 2004.
After spending a minimum period of two years
in ERM II, the country’s convergence with the
euro area could be assessed in mid-2006 at the
earliest. After a positive examination and
following some preparatory work, the country
would enter the euro area in January 2007.
At a country level, the target dates range from
2007 (with an occasional reference to the later
part of 2006) to around 2010. In several
countries the central banks initially seemed to
favour an earlier date than the government,
mainly reflecting the difficult fiscal situation in
countries concerned, but more recently such
differences in views about the optimal timing
appear to be abating. This is inter alia due to the
fact that in most acceding countries, the
government and the central bank have
formulated joint strategies on prospective
monetary integration, or talks to this end have
reached an advanced stage. The Economic
Dialogue process between the EU and the
acceding countries, in particular the Pre-
accession Economic Programme (PEP)
exercise, has apparently also helped the
discussion process in individual countries on
monetary integration matters. Most recently, for
example, such joint strategy documents have
been released by Slovakia (June 2003),
Hungary (July 2003), the Czech Republic
(October 2003) and Slovenia (November 2003).
2 CHALLENGES OF EURO ADOPTION
The stretching-out of euro adoption plans in
some acceding countries clearly has to do with
difficulties caused by fiscal situations and
concerns that rapid consolidation may entail
major short-term output losses or may lack
sufficient political backing on other grounds,
for example owing to perceived opposition to
cuts in transfers or subsidies. Some acceding
country central bankers have argued, however,
that the sacrifice ratio may not depend on the
speed of fiscal consolidation, that rapid
consolidation may be less prone to reversals,
and that an early meeting of the convergence
criteria would allow the benefits of monetary
union to be reaped sooner rather than later. The
fiscal issues and challenges that the acceding
countries are facing will be discussed further
in Section 2.3.8. At this point, it is worth noting
that in the cases of the Czech Republic, Poland
and Malta, the fiscal trajectories enshrined in
the 2003 PEPs do not foresee that the budget
deficit criterion will be met throughout the
whole programming period, which extends
from 2003 to 2006. In case the fiscal strategies
of these three countries materialise along the
lines laid out in the 2003 PEPs, the budget
deficit criterion would not be fulfilled before
the year 2007 at the earliest. This in turn would
imply that a positive convergence assessment
would not be possible before 2008, and that the
euro could not be introduced before 2009 at the
earliest, assuming that euro area membership
continues to take place at the beginning of a
calendar year.
15 As the 2004 enlargement approaches, the debate about the optimal timing
of adopting the euro is intensifying. In fact, this debate actually started a
couple of years ago, when some acceding countries considered adopting
the euro unilaterally as legal tender, i.e. before joining the EU. Following
strong opposition by the ECB among others, the acceding countries
refrained from taking such a step, but at the same time underlined their
intention to enter the euro area as soon as possible, while remaining fully
in line with the Treaty.
16 If this assumption were to be relaxed, an adoption of the euro as early as
the later part of 2006 could be technically feasible.24
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Box 3
STATEMENTS BY ACCEDING COUNTRIES ON THE TIMING OF EURO ADOPTION
Cyprus “The target date for adopting the euro remains the year 2007...
notwithstanding the increased difficulties that have risen because of the
recent fiscal slippages.” PEP 2003.
Czech Republic “The Czech Republic should join the euro zone as soon as plausible
economic conditions have been created.” PEP 2003. Most statements
that address the timing issue more concretely point to the end of the
decade as a realistic time horizon for euro adoption.
Estonia “Estonia can obtain full European Union membership as soon as 2006.”
PEP 2003.
Hungary “In order to realise the benefits of the adoption of the common currency,
the Government decided to introduce the euro on 1 January 2008.” PEP
2003.
Latvia “The earliest period when Latvia could really join the EMU is 1st January
2008.” PEP 2003.
Lithuania “Realistically, the euro would probably replace the litas from the start of
2007…” Governor Sarkinas, March 2003.
Malta “We can imagine we are ready to introduce the euro in the second half of
2007 or in January 2008 at the latest.” Governor Bonello, February
2004.
Poland  “Poland should join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) so soon
as possible only if the macroeconomic conditions make it possible ...
Taking into account the condition of Poland’s economy and the
Government’s projections of the general government deficit for the
oncoming years, it should be expected that Poland will fulfil the nominal
convergence criteria stated in the Maastricht Treaty in 2007, so as to
become a member of the Economic and Monetary Union in 2008 or
2009.” PEP 2003.
Slovakia “The earliest realistic target for admission would be 2008.” Strategy of
the Slovak Republic for adoption of the Euro, June 2003.
Slovenia “Both the Bank and the Government support adoption of the euro at the
earliest opportunity and judge that it will be possible at the beginning of
2007.” Joint programme of the Slovenian Government and Bank of
Slovenia for ERM II entry and adoption of the euro, November 2003.25
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While in the initial stages of the discussion, the
benefits of an early adoption of the euro were
seen, by virtually all acceding countries, as far
outweighing any associated costs, the picture
has in the meantime become more nuanced. As
for the benefits, acceding countries stress that
early EMU membership would strengthen
economic policy discipline, accelerate structural
reforms and raise the economies’ growth
potential through higher investment following
the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty.
More specifically, some acceding country
authorities and officials stress that early EMU
membership “should have positive impacts on
domestic economic policy [through requiring]
balanced public budgets” (Czech National
Bank, 2003b) and “would mobilise candidate
countries to complete their structural reforms”
(Balcerowicz, 2002). In particular, the central
banks stress the advantage of the EU policy
coordinating framework and the multilateral
surveillance procedure to impose fiscal
discipline on their governments. As regards the
elimination of nominal exchange rate
uncertainty, it is argued that this would imply
benefits arising from lower transaction costs,17
enhance trade and investment, and lower the
risks of financial sector disturbances. At the
same time, “the Stability and Growth Pact,
coupled with a decline in the risk premium, …
would lead to a stabilisation of long-term
interest rates at a low level” (Czech National
Bank, 2003a).
The costs of an early euro adoption are in
general not seen as significant in those
countries that have no or only relatively
moderate fiscal deficits. In the other countries,
the mainly medium and long-term gains of euro
adoption have increasingly been contrasted with
the short-term costs of fiscal consolidation. As
for other potential costs, a number of central
banks have argued that the cost of relinquishing
independent monetary policy and flexible
exchange rates is limited owing to the high
degree of trade and financial integration with
the euro area (Balcerowicz, 2002). Moreover, it
has been maintained that the ongoing
harmonisation in economic structures and
business cycles will diminish the importance of
asymmetric shocks over time (Szapary, 2002).
Overall, by taking all these arguments together,
an early euro adoption is expected to boost
growth in acceding countries through higher
investment and trade, and thereby to contribute
to real convergence with the EU countries. A
study by Magyar Nemzeti Bank estimates that
euro area membership will boost GDP growth
in the long run by 0.6% to 0.9% per year,
whereas in the short term the benefits and costs
are seen to cancel each other out (Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, 2002).
A number of academics openly support the
acceding countries’ strategies for an early
adoption of the euro. They mainly refer to the
fact that the capital markets of acceding
countries are small and liberalised, which could
make them vulnerable to financial crises or
trigger excessive exchange rate volatility (see
e.g. Buiter and Grafe, 2002; Coricelli, 2002;
Eichengreen, 2003). The adoption of the euro
could also eliminate the interest rate premium
and reduce interest rates (Coricelli, 2002).18
Finally, some authors argue that an ambitious
timetable for the adoption of the euro would
trigger earlier reforms of public finances and
would thereby contribute to higher growth
(Center for European Policy Studies, 2002).
2.2 A REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS MADE IN
NOMINAL CONVERGENCE
Achieving a high degree of sustainable nominal
convergence, as laid down in the convergence
criteria listed in the Treaty, is a necessary
condition for an EU Member State with a
derogation to enter the euro area. The rationale
behind these criteria is to ensure a high degree
of sustainable convergence with the euro area,
assessed on the basis of inflation developments,
long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability
17 In Hungary, reduced transaction costs were estimated to increase the
level of GDP with a one-off effect of 0.18 to 0.30 percentage points
(Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2002).
18 See also Mundell (2002) and Gros (2000).26
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and the fiscal position in terms of public deficit
and debt. In addition, the Treaty mentions
“other factors” that should be taken into account
when assessing the degree of convergence such
as “the results of the integration of markets,
the situation and development of the balances
of payments on current account and an
examination of the developments of unit labour
costs and other price indices” (Art. 121.1). On
the basis of the convergence criteria and these
other factors, the Commission and the ECB will
examine the degree of sustainable convergence
achieved by each Member State. Taking into
account these reports, the European Council,
acting by qualified majority on a
recommendation from the Commission and
having sought the opinion of the European
Parliament, will decide whether or not to
abrogate the derogation of the Member States
concerned.
This section reviews the current performance of
the acceding countries against the backdrop of
nominal convergence. The purpose of this
section is to inspect where acceding countries
Table 2 Economic indicators in view of convergence criteria
Sources: ECB, Eurostat, Pre-accession Economic Programmes 2003 and Bloomberg.
Note: Reference values are calculated for current EU Member States and in line with the ECB Convergence Reports.
1) Period average; CPI for Malta. The EU countries with the lowest inflation rate in 2002 were Belgium, Germany and the UK.
2) Period average.
3) Based on the IMF De Facto Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy as of 30 June 2003.
4) Weighted by nominal GDP in 2002.
5) 10-year kroon bank loans to households
6) Bank of Slovenia perceives the interest rate on RS44 government bonds issued in November 2002 as the best approximation of long-
term bond interest rates in Slovenia.
7) For Slovenia, the regime operating de facto in the country is different from its de jure regime, which is a managed float.
HICP Fiscal balance Public debt Long-term
inflation1) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) yields2) Exchange rate
(2002) (2002) (2002) (2002) regime3)
Cyprus 2.8 -3.5 59.7 5.1 5-y ERM II shadow
Czech Republic 1.4 -6.7 26.9 4.8 10-y managed float
Estonia 3.6 1.3 5.8 7.4 10-y  5) CBA (euro)
Hungary 5.2 -9.2 56.3 7.1 10-y ERM II shadow
Latvia 2.0 -3.0 14.6 5.3 5-y peg to SDR
Lithuania 0.4 -1.7 22.7 5.2 5-y CBA (euro)
Malta 2.2 -6.2 66.6 5.4 5-y peg to basket
Poland 1.9 -3.8 41.8 7.3 10-y float
Slovakia 3.3 -7.2 44.3 7.0 5-y managed float
Slovenia 7.5 -2.4 27.8 6.7 10-y  6) crawling bands 7)
AC-10 4) 2.7 -5.1 39.9 6.6
Reference value 2.9 -3.0 60.0 6.9
currently stand in terms of the Maastricht
criteria, and to highlight the main possible
challenges that individual acceding countries
face in meeting the criteria in the future. This
section does not intend to provide or “pre-empt”
any convergence assessment in these terms, but
rather to help in assessing whether the strategy
of adopting the euro a few years after EU entry
is indeed a realistic policy option from today’s
perspective.
When looking at economic indicators in view of
the convergence criteria, it appears that a few
acceding countries currently already comply
numerically with several criteria (obviously
with the exception of the two years of ERM
participation). With the caveat in mind that data
still have to be fully harmonised with ESA 95
standards (in particular in the fiscal area), an
analysis of the most recent data available
suggests the following (see Table 2).19
19 In the following analysis, reference is made to weighted averages for the
acceding countries as a group. Clearly, the convergence examinations
will be undertaken on a country-by-country basis. The averages are
presented for reasons of illustration.27
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– In 2002, the weighted average of the HICP
inflation rate in acceding countries stood at
2.7%, thus even slightly below the
corresponding hypothetical reference value
of 2.9% for 2002.20 There are six acceding
countries with an inflation rate currently
below the reference value: Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and
Poland.
– As regards the fiscal criteria, deficits in
acceding countries amounted on average to
5.1% of GDP in 2002, well above the
threshold of 3% of GDP.21 The figures
varied significantly across countries, with
only Lithuania and Slovenia having fiscal
deficits of below 3% of GDP and Estonia
even a surplus, while the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia had
fiscal deficits well above the threshold. The
debt-to-GDP ratio stood on average at
around 40% of GDP. With the exception of
Malta, the ratio in all countries was below
60% of GDP.
– Concerning interest rates, long-term interest
rates in acceding countries stood on average
at 6.6% in 2002, compared with 6.9%
according to the calculated reference value.22
In fact, interest rates were below the
reference value in most acceding countries,
but slightly higher in Estonia, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. However, it should be
noted that in 2002 10-year bond instruments
were not available in all acceding countries.
Looking ahead, the budget deficit criterion may
well pose difficulties for some countries,
especially for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia, as the fiscal situation has
deteriorated in these countries, often
significantly, in recent years. The deficit is also
clearly above the 3% threshold in Cyprus and
Malta. Moreover, fiscal pressures may increase
in other acceding countries that have smaller
deficits at this stage. Section 2.3.8 explores this
issue in greater detail, with a particular focus on
the challenges that have arisen in the context of
achieving sustained fiscal consolidation and
restraint, while at the same time highlighting the
current and prospective spending pressures the
acceding countries are facing (e.g. in the area of
acquis implementation and EU membership
contributions). In addition, the remainder of
this paper examines some factors in greater
depth, such as current account developments,
several price and competitiveness indicators,
and overheating issues, which may help in
assessing the acceding countries’ medium-term
orientation towards price stability and sustained
growth.
It should be noted that the reliability of data,
especially fiscal data, remains a matter of
concern. While it is generally difficult to
provide reliable fiscal data, problems in
acceding countries are even more pronounced,
for various reasons. In methodological terms,
the full implementation of ESA 95 standards is
still to be completed in these countries, and a
number of difficult classification issues still
have to be fully resolved over the next months.
Furthermore, there may still be some remaining
problems with providing fully consolidated
accounts that incorporate all budgetary activities
and display all obligations appropriately.
Furthermore, in some acceding countries, the
assessment of the fiscal situation may also be
blurred by considerable contingent liabilities. Full
compliance with EU rules in the provision of
statistics will help to reduce these problem spots
and is therefore of key importance.
Interestingly, a comparison between the
acceding countries in 2002, five years before
their intended adoption of the euro, and the
current Member States five years before they
qualified for EMU, i.e. 1996 for Greece and
1994 for the other euro area countries, shows
20 According to the ECB Convergence Reports, the reference value for
the inflation criterion is based on taking the annual unweighted average
of the rate of inflation in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation
rates, and adding 1.5 percentage points.
21 Again, it should be noted that while these figures are based on the Pre-
accession Economic Programmes prepared by the acceding countries,
they are not yet fully adjusted to ESA 95 standards.
22 According to the ECB Convergence Reports, the reference value for
the interest rate criterion is based on taking the arithmetic average of the
long-term interest rates of the three countries with the lowest inflation
rates, and adding 2 percentage points.28
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that acceding countries have come much closer
to nominal convergence. HICP inflation in 2002
was in most acceding countries far lower than in
Greece, Portugal and Spain five years before
they entered the euro area. As regards long-term
interest rates, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
had, five years before they entered the euro
area, much higher interest rates than acceding
countries have today. Moreover, while the
fiscal situation was rather mixed for both sets
of countries, most acceding countries have
lower debt ratios.
2.3 A BROADER ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
The preceding analysis has been based on the
Maastricht Treaty framework, which forms the
basis for future convergence assessments of
new Member States, in line with what has been
done in the past, and based on the equal
treatment principle between prospective and
current participants in the euro area.
The approach taken in the remainder of this
paper is a broader one, in line with the basic aim
to get an analytical handle on the acceding
countries’ monetary integration strategies and,
in particular, to examine in depth whether
the economic logic of these strategies is sound
from today’s perspective. To avoid any
misunderstandings, it should be underlined that
this broader approach is not at all directed at
identifying new criteria or “reinterpreting” the
framework enshrined in the Treaty on the
European Union. Nor is it the purpose of the
paper to endorse or support, in any form, the
announced monetary integration strategies of
acceding countries. Rather, the basic aim is to
provide an informed and balanced review of the
economic wisdom of these strategies, in order
to prepare a view of the Eurosystem on the
underlying issues and foster the dialogue with
acceding countries’ central banks.
An obvious starting point for such a broader
analysis is the optimum currency area (OCA)
theory, which is the standard reference point in
terms of economic theory for many current
discussions about the acceding countries’
prospective readiness to join the euro area.
According to the OCA theory, countries can be
considered as part of an optimum currency area
if they fulfil certain criteria, which determine
the symmetry of external shocks and the
capacity of a country to absorb shocks. These
criteria refer to the similarity of economic
structures, business cycle synchronisation, the
degree of trade and financial integration, the
flexibility of goods prices and wages, as well as
factor mobility. The OCA theory suggests that
if these criteria are fulfilled, a country can
abandon the exchange rate as an adjustment
tool.
Nevertheless, despite some important insights,
the OCA theory has often been criticised for
being inconclusive and offering only a limited
analytical framework. For example, the theory
does not provide definite answers to the
effective costs and benefits, their correlation
and the optimal timing of monetary integration.
This is also related to the endogeneity of the
OCA criteria. In fact, by reducing transaction
costs and market imperfections, joining a
currency union could foster trade and financial
integration and increase goods and wage
flexibility. Likewise, within a currency union
economic structures could adjust and business
cycles could become more synchronised across
countries. Empirically, there is some evidence
that supports the endogeneity of the OCA
criteria (Rose, 2000; Rose and Van Wincoop,
2001; Melitz, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2000),
although the findings of this strand of the
literature have met with considerable criticism
(see Nitsch, 2002; Honohan, 2001; Persson,
2001; compare also Rose, 2001 for limited
applicability in the case of EMU).23 Overall, the
results have therefore been interpreted and
applied with caution. This is particularly true
23 Moreover, one should not fully disregard Krugman’s (1993)
specialisation hypothesis as a theoretically possible alternative outcome.
According to Krugman, an increase in trade owing to the use of a common
currency does not necessarily mean a lower exposure to asymmetric
shocks, but could result in countries becoming more specialised due to
increasing returns to scale. As a result, the sensitivity of countries to
industry-specific shocks could increase, resulting in less synchronised
business cycles.29
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with regard to the question as to whether
monetary union fosters structural reform. At
any rate, it takes time for any endogenous
effects to work their way through the economic
system, and the dynamics of such a process
are difficult to anticipate. Thus, the period
that leads to the new equilibrium may well be
fairly lengthy, which implies that adjustment
mechanisms other than the exchange rate would
be particularly important in absorbing shocks.
Against this background, the following chapter
discusses where acceding countries stand
compared with the euro area with respect to the
most important OCA criteria, and how these
criteria are likely to develop over time owing to
EU accession and the impact of further
monetary integration. The criteria considered
here are the similarity of economic structures,
the degree of trade integration, the flexibility of
labour markets, and the degree of financial
integration. Furthermore, irrespective of the
traditional OCA criteria, other factors need to
be taken into account, as joining the euro area
too early might entail substantial costs for
acceding countries. Therefore, this chapter
also discusses the differences in economic
dynamics in acceding countries compared with
the euro area (in terms of trend growth, output
volatility and business cycle synchronisation),
the risks for external competitiveness, the
impact of interest rates declining to the euro
area level, and the optimal pace of fiscal
consolidation.
2.3.1 ECONOMIC STRUCTURES
GDP income levels in acceding countries are
still well below those in the euro area, with
GDP per capita standing at around 50% of the
euro area average in PPP terms, ranging from
36% in Latvia to 75% in Slovenia (see
Chart 3).24 Nevertheless, acceding countries
have experienced strong economic expansion,
with real GDP growing on average at 3.6%
(weighted) over the period 1993 to 2002, which
is well above the average real growth rate of
around 2% in the euro area. As most countries
started from a low income per capita level and
experienced a severe recession at the beginning
of transition, the catching-up in income levels
with the euro area can be expected to take a long
time for most countries. Alongside this process,
acceding countries will tend to experience
structural differences in economic dynamics.
These real convergence issues will be dealt with
in greater detail in Section 2.3.5.
Nevertheless, economic structures in acceding
countries have already been continuously
adjusted towards those in the euro area. In fact,
acceding countries have made substantial
progress in transition and have advanced both
in terms of institutional convergence and in
bringing their economic structures broadly in
line with those in the euro area. Although
similar economic structures to the euro area are
far from being a sufficient condition to benefit
from EMU membership, it could be interpreted
as being favourable for the countries’ capacity
Chart 3 GDP per capita in PPP terms
(as a % of the euro area average)
Sources: Eurostat and European Commission.
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24 Income levels are highest in Slovenia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, and are close to those in Portugal and Greece, while per capita
GDP in most of the other acceding countries is about two-thirds this level.
When they joined the euro area, Spain, Portugal and Greece registered
GDP per capita levels amounting respectively to 85%, 70% and 67% of
the euro area average in PPP terms.30
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Chart 4 Institutional reform (2003)
(index: 100 = well-functioning market economy)

























to absorb economic shocks and to face similar
shocks.25 Moreover, EU accession is expected
to further foster convergence, as by that time
acceding countries will have to complete the
adoption and, even more importantly, the
implementation of the acquis communautaire
(apart from those areas where transition
arrangements apply and full harmonisation will
take place later). Furthermore, upon EU
accession, acceding countries will be included
in most of the procedures for multilateral
surveillance as laid down in the EU Treaty. Yet,
stronger coordination of economic policies is
likely to contribute to a further deepening of
economic integration with the current EU
Member States.
The acceding countries’ progress in completing
transition was recently confirmed by the
European Commission, which judged each of
the ten countries to have established a
functioning market economy.26 As regards the
acceding countries’ capacity to withstand
competitive pressure and market forces within
the Union, this is already the case for Cyprus
and Malta, while the other eight countries are
judged to be sufficiently capable upon
accession if they continue on their current
reform paths. Moreover, acceding countries
were acknowledged to have reached a high level
of alignment with the acquis communautaire by
continuously bringing institutions and
regulatory frameworks into line with EU
standards. At the same time, implementation
and enforcement still have to be further
improved in several areas by a number of
countries. In this context, the Commission has
established a comprehensive monitoring
mechanism and an action plan to ensure
compliance until accession.
This assessment is broadly in line with the
EBRD transition indicators, which confirm
notable progress in the areas of privatisation
and liberalisation of markets and prices,
although further progress would be needed with
regard to financial institutions in most central
and eastern European acceding countries.27
Some differences also exist across countries
with respect to reforms in enterprise
privatisation and restructuring. In contrast,
progress in the area of markets and competition
is fairly homogeneous across all eight countries
(see Chart 4).28
Finally, the economic size of the three broad
sectors and the distribution of employment
across sectors have gradually converged
towards those in the euro area, despite
large differences across countries (see Table 3).
This evidence has to be interpreted with
caution, however, since it does not take into
account differences that may exist at a more
disaggregated level. At the broad sectoral level,
the current GDP shares of agriculture and
industry are still higher in acceding countries
than in the euro area (3.5% and 31.6% compared
with 2.0% and 27.0% in the EU), reflecting the
still ongoing restructuring process, while the
25 The OCA theory suggests that countries with similar economic structures
seem to be less affected by asymmetric shocks and respond to shocks in
a similar way, so that business cycles are also likely to be more
harmonised across countries. Under such circumstances, independent
interest rate policy can be considered as being less relevant for output
stabilisation. See Corden (1972) and Tavlas (1994).
26 See the Regular Report 2002 for all acceding countries. Regular
Reports assess to which extent acceding countries already fulfil the
Copenhagen criteria (i.e. EU membership criteria).
27 EBRD transition indicators do not exist for Cyprus and Malta.
28 For further information on financial sector integration, see Part 2,
Section 2.3.4.31
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services sector (64.9% of GDP) is somewhat
smaller than in the EU (71.0%).29 Yet, structural
differences with the EU are considerable when
looking at the distribution of employment
across sectors. In fact, the employment shares
in acceding countries are significantly larger in
the agriculture and industry sectors and lower
in the services sector compared with the EU.
Acceding countries’ relative productivity in
the agriculture sector is clearly lower, and
productivity in the services sector higher,
compared with economy-wide productivity than
in the EU, while relative productivity in the
industry sector seems comparable. Against this
background, further adjustments in economic
structures are conceivable during the catching-
up process.
Moreover, countries display large differences
with respect to sector shares and employment
distribution. In particular, Latvia and Lithuania
have a considerably larger agriculture sector
than the EU, both in terms of GDP and
employment share. In Poland, the share of
employees in the agriculture sector is more than
20 percentage points higher than in the EU,
while the economic size of the agriculture sector
is rather similar, pointing to a much larger
Economic size as a % of GDP Employment distribution as a % of total
Agricultural Industry and Services Agricultural Industry and Services
construction construction
Cyprus 4.1 20.3 75.6 5.1 23.4 71.4
Czech Republic 3.2 37.3 59.5 4.8 40.0 55.3
Estonia 5.4 29.3 65.3 6.9 31.2 62.0
Hungary 3.7 30.7 65.6 6.2 34.1 59.7
Latvia 4.7 24.7 70.6 15.1 24.4 60.5
Lithuania 7.1 30.5 62.4 17.4 27.4 55.2
Malta 2.8 28.1 69.1 2.0 31.7 66.3
Poland 3.1 30.3 66.5 26.3 26.2 47.5
Slovakia 4.4 31.1 64.5 6.2 38.5 55.3
Slovenia 3.3 36.0 60.7 11.0 37.0 52.0
AC-10 3.5 31.6 64.9 15.8 31.2 53.0
Greece 7.0 22.3 70.8 15.3 24.2 60.4
Portugal 3.5 28.0 68.5 12.0 34.0 54.0
Spain 3.2 28.5 68.2 5.9 29.4 64.7
EU 2.0 27.0 71.0 3.9 28.2 67.8
Table 3 Economic size and labour distribution of sectors
(2002)
Source: Eurostat.
productivity gap between the agriculture sector
and the economy as a whole in Poland than in
the EU.30 Moreover, in the Czech Republic and
Slovenia the industry sectors are considerably
larger and the services sector smaller. The
relative share of employment in the services
sector is much lower in most acceding
countries, with the exception of Cyprus and
Malta. Nevertheless, the above figures might be
affected by the fact that the shadow economy
still plays a relatively larger role in most
acceding countries. In addition, a more refined
view of the similarity in economic structures
would require further analysis of more
disaggregated sectoral figures, considering also
the differences in the quality of products.
2.3.2 TRADE INTEGRATION
Diversified export structures and strong trade
links between countries, particularly when
29 The following analysis takes the EU as a reference point with a view to
drawing an inclusive picture. An analysis based on figures for the current
euro area would yield a very similar picture.
30 However, the demographic structure of the Polish agriculture sector,
where the average age is close to 60, might also imply a gradual decline
in the high employment share over time.32
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intra-industrial trade accounts for a high share
of trade, are expected to reduce the exposure to
asymmetric shocks and to harmonise the
capacity to absorb shocks. As one of the main
elements of the OCA theory, strong trade links
suggest that country-specific policies, and in
particular nominal exchange rate flexibility, are
less needed.31 This view has been contested by
some authors, who argue that closer monetary
integration would rather favour specialisation
in production and would therefore reduce the
synchronisation of business cycles.32 However,
it could be argued that specialisation is often
related more to regions than countries.33
Moreover, several empirical studies have
indeed found a significant positive correlation
between trade integration and shock symmetry,
which is particularly strong with a higher share
of intra-industrial trade.34
With the partial exception of Poland, acceding
countries are small and highly open economies,
with a degree of openness of around 80% of
GDP, compared with 58% for the weighted
average of individual euro area countries if
intra-euro area trade is included (see Chart 5).
The most open countries are Malta, Estonia,
Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Acceding countries already have close trade
relations with the EU, accounting for 67% of
total exports and 60% of total imports (see
Chart 6). Expressed in GDP terms, the acceding
countries’ EU trade accounts on average for
52%. This compares well with the level of trade
integration among the current EU members,
whose exports and imports within the EU are on
average around 60% of total trade. However,
large differences exist across countries, also
compared with the euro area, with several
acceding countries displaying somewhat less
intense trade relations with the EU, measured as
a share of total trade, than most of the current
EU Member States. But if the process of trade
orientation of the acceding countries towards
the EU continues to progress as in recent years,
these countries will in a few years be as highly
integrated into EU trade as the current EU
members.
Chart 5 Degree of openness (2002)
(total exports and imports as a % of GDP)
Sources: IMF DOTS and Eurostat for weights.
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Interestingly, the countries that are currently
highly integrated with the EU, such as the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia, are not those with the highest degree
of openness, while the most open economies,
such as Estonia, Malta and Slovakia, are less
integrated with the EU. There are specific
reasons for this: for Estonia, trade with the
other Baltic countries and Russia is still
relatively important; Malta trades significantly
with Asia; and Slovakia maintains a substantial
trade share with the Czech Republic. Yet, the
lower degree of trade integration with the EU
might suggest that these countries, which have
significant trade with non-EU/non-accession
countries, could be somewhat more exposed to
external demand shocks originating from third
countries than the euro area.
Importantly, a large part (around 40%) of the
acceding countries’ trade with the euro area is
intra-industrial, most of which is classified as
vertical intra-industrial trade, i.e. the exchange
31 McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969).
32 Krugman (1993).
33 De Grauwe and Aksoy (1999).
34 Frankel and Rose (1998), Maurel (2002), Fidrmuc and Schardax (2000).33
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of similar goods of different quality (see
Chart 7).35 This is important with respect to the
question of euro adoption, as it suggests that
countries with a high degree of intra-industrial
trade will be subject to similar shocks and
pattern of industrial activity. At a country level,
the role of intra-industrial trade seems to be
particularly high in those countries with strong
trade links with the EU. In fact, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have a
high share of intra-industrial trade with the EU,
ranging from 46% of total EU trade in Poland to
65% in the Czech Republic. In contrast, intra-
industrial trade with the EU is relatively low in
Latvia and Lithuania, which have a share of less
than 20% of total EU trade.36 The pattern of
intra-industrial trade partly mirrors the pattern
of trade specialisation and the role of
technology-driven industries. For example, the
importance of technology-driven industries is
relatively high in the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary and Poland, while in Latvia and
Lithuania specialisation has taken place with
respect to labour-intensive industries.
Chart 6 Acceding countries’ trade with the
EU
(exports and imports of goods to the EU as a percentage of
total trade in goods)
Sources: IMF  DOTS and Eurostat for weights.
Note: Data for 1997 instead of 1995 for Belgium and Luxembourg.
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In sum, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia seem to be most integrated with
the EU in trade terms and have the highest share
of intra-industrial trade with the EU. This
suggests that they are likely to be subject to
similar patterns in industrial activity and shocks
as current EU Member States. In contrast,
Latvia and Lithuania stand out as being among
the least integrated with the EU and also have a
low degree of intra-industrial trade.
2.3.3 LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY
Flexible labour and goods markets can facilitate
adjustment to asymmetric shocks. According to
the OCA theory, the need for nominal exchange
rate adjustments is lower the more prices and
wages are flexible, particularly downwards, and
35 In comparison, the share of intra-industrial trade in the euro area is well
above 50%.
36 However, the low degree of intra-industrial trade might also be due to the
small size of the economies and their relatively lower degree of
diversification.
Chart 7 Share of intra-industrial trade in
acceding countries
(as a % of total EU trade, 2000)
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the more production factors are mobile across
and within countries.37 Moreover, labour
market structures may have a bearing on how
efficiently an economy adjusts to shocks. The
flexibility of labour markets is particularly
difficult to assess and quantify, but several
indicators may be useful, such as the degree of
labour turnover, the strictness of the
employment protection legislation in place, the
generosity of unemployment benefit systems,
the centralisation of wage bargaining, the level
of minimum wages and the flexibility of
nominal wages.
Labour market developments in acceding
countries generally reveal major future
challenges: unemployment rates are high and
rising, the share of long-term unemployment is
substantial, and labour force participation is
declining. However, large differences exist
across countries, with unemployment rates in
2002 ranging from around 5% to 6% in Cyprus,
Hungary and Slovenia to 19% in Poland and
Slovakia (see Charts 8 and 9). Comparable data
available for the OECD countries show that
long-term unemployment shares in all four
OECD members (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia) are similar to those in the
euro area, despite a far shorter history of
unemployment in the transition economies.
Labour force participation, although still higher
as a legacy of the past regimes, continues to
decline in practically all countries, and is
gradually reaching euro area levels.
While part of the increase in unemployment may
largely be a consequence of the still ongoing
transition process, challenges arise mainly from
its persistence over time. The increase in
unemployment in some acceding countries
during the late 1990s despite rapid economic
growth suggests that unemployment is mostly a
structural problem rather than a cyclical one.
This analysis seems to be confirmed by the
relatively high incidence of long-term
unemployment. In most acceding countries, the
share of those that have been unemployed for
Chart 8 Unemployment rate in the Central
European acceding countries





























Chart 9 Unemployment rate in the Baltics,
Cyprus and Malta




























1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002





























1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
37 See Friedman (1953), Mundell (1961).35
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more than a year in the total number of
unemployed is not only higher than the EU
average, but has also been increasing in recent
years, in contrast with the experience in the EU.
The lack of a distinctive correlation between
economic growth and employment growth in
acceding countries is also in contrast with the
experience across the EU (see Chart 11).
High rates of unemployment do not appear to be
correlated with specific exchange rate regimes.
Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania, the three
acceding countries with the highest
unemployment rates, themselves cover the
spectrum from hard pegs to flexible exchange
rate regimes. The widespread nature of
unemployment points to structural reasons
(such as skills mismatches) as being a likely
source of these persistently high unemployment
rates.
This persistence can also be partly explained by
the rather low levels of inter-regional labour
mobility in many countries. In fact, the
incidence of high unemployment regions is
much higher across acceding countries than
within the EU (see Charts 12 and 13).
Mobility across jobs and the creation of new
jobs, as measured by the job turnover rate, have
also declined significantly since the early
Chart 13 Histogram of regional
unemployment rates in the larger Central
European acceding countries1) (2001)
(percentages)
1) Slovenia and the Baltics excluded from the analysis as they are one
NUTS-2 region each.
y-axis:  relative frequency

















std. dev.:  7.2
Chart 12 Histogram of EU regional
unemployment rates (2001)
(percentages)
Sources: Eurostat, ECB staff calculations.
y-axis:  relative frequency

















std. dev.:  4.6 
1990s, when the initial stages of transition led
to a high turnover in jobs. Against this
background, mobility across sectors and
regions cannot be regarded as a very effective
mechanism for absorbing idiosyncratic
shocks.38
Other indicators of labour market flexibility,
such as employment protection legislation, shed
a more positive light on the situation in
acceding countries. In fact, employment
38 See Fidrmuc (2002).
Chart 11 Correlation real GDP growth –
employment growth, EU-15 and the Central
and Eastern European acceding countries
(1997-2001)1)
Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.
1) 1998-01 for Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia; 1999-01 for Latvia
and Lithuania; and 2000-01 for Slovakia.
AC-8: R2 = 0.06 (n = 30)
EU countries: Elasticity = 0.55, R2 = 0.52 (n = 75)
employment growth rate (percent)
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legislation can be regarded as less strict than in
the euro area (see Chart 14).39
Nominal rigidities are difficult to measure and
may change as a consequence of changes in the
monetary regime. Nominal wage growth in the
acceding countries has on average moderated
alongside disinflation. This seems to suggest
that there is some degree of nominal wage
flexibility, at least in the range of positive
nominal wage growth. However, there have
been two episodes of high nominal wage
growth which do not fit this generally positive
picture, namely in the Czech Republic in the
mid-1990s and in Hungary since 2001. It
should be borne in mind that so far there has
been little need for downward flexibility of
nominal wages in acceding countries owing to
the catching-up process on the one hand and
higher inflation until recently on the other. An
exception was the experience of some sectors in
the Baltic countries after the Russian crisis,
where wages appeared flexible downwards.
Yet, with acceding countries approaching a low
inflation environment, the need for downward
flexibility of nominal wages may become more
frequent and nominal downward rigidities more
biting, in particular if output fluctuations are
pronounced.
Flexible and sufficiently differentiated wages
are of crucial importance for enhancing the
efficiency of labour markets in matching supply
and demand. In this context, whether wage
bargaining takes place collectively, and if so, at
which level, may have implications for wage
growth. Another relevant piece of information
for assessing nominal rigidities relates to the
duration of nominal wage contracts and to the
extent to which they are synchronised or
staggered. Overall, nominal wage contracts in
acceding countries are typically of a relatively
short duration (which may be related to the past
experience of inflation persistence in some
countries). Moreover, there appears to be no
particular evidence that would point to an
exceptionally high degree of staggering of
nominal wage contracts.
Wage-setting frameworks and the role of trade
unions in wage formation differ widely across
countries. Table 4 hereafter shows that when
collective bargaining takes place in acceding
countries, it does so mostly at the company
level. In Slovakia, where collective bargaining
takes place predominantly at the sectoral level,
there is no evidence that pay increases have
been particularly hefty, as high and persistent
unemployment has most probably dampened
wage demands. Acceding countries also exhibit
relatively low and declining rates of trade union
membership.
Heterogeneity across acceding countries is also
a feature of the level of the minimum wage.
Excessively high statutory minimum wages may
deter employment, particularly of young age
groups. In January 2003, Slovenia had a
national minimum wage broadly comparable to
that in Portugal (416 EUR per month) or in
Spain (526 EUR per month), the two Member
States with the lowest minimum wages. All
other continental acceding countries were
clearly below EU levels (see Table 5 hereafter).
However, when comparing the minimum wage
with the average wage, most acceding countries
have relatively generous minimum wages when
39 The availability of comparable cross-country information is very limited.
Given the numerous changes in labour market legislation across countries
on an ongoing basis, assessment based on stock-taking exercises
conducted in the past must be particularly cautious.37
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compared with Spain (where the minimum wage
represents around 35% of the average wage)
and Portugal (where the corresponding figure is
44%).
The level of unemployment benefits as
measured by the replacement ratio (i.e. initial
benefit over previous earned income) is
relatively modest in the Baltic countries, but
relatively generous in countries such as
Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia. Comparing
unemployment benefit systems across countries
using indicators such as the replacement ratio is
nevertheless subject to great uncertainty. This
is because the parameters of unemployment
benefits, such as the length of entitlement to
benefits, differ greatly across countries
according to workers’ contributive history, and
thus the average unemployed person may well
receive a very different benefit than the
statutory maximum. Thus, looking at the public
expenditure on unemployment benefits as a
proportion of GDP complements the
information on the statutory generosity of the
unemployment benefit system. This indicates
that spending on unemployment benefits is
particularly low in the Baltic countries,
especially in Estonia and Lithuania, while
Bargaining level Collective Average pay
bargaining increase in 2001 Usual weekly
Company Sectoral Intersectoral
coverage (percent, adjusted working hours
(percent of for inflation)
workers)
Central Europe
Czech Republic *** * 25-30 3.9 42.3
Hungary *** ** * 34 8.4 42.9
Poland *** * 40 1.4 45.1
Slovakia * *** 48 0.9 42.9
Slovenia * ** *** ca. 100 3.5 39.7
Baltics
Estonia *** * 29 7.2 42.4
Latvia *** * * < 20 3.7 44.3
Lithuania *** * 10-15 0.8 44.8
Table 4 Wage-setting framework in acceding countries
(2001)
Sources: ECB staff compilation based on EIRO/ILO (2002) and ETUC (2002).
Note: (*) Existing level of wage bargaining; (**) Important but not dominant level of wage bargaining; (***) Dominant level of wage
bargaining.
earlier data show that central European acceding
countries typically spend more than the Baltics
in unemployment benefits although, with the
exception of Poland, they are still far below the
EU average.
It should be noted that the issue of nominal
rigidities not only pertains to labour markets,
but equally to product markets. Nominal price
flexibility is typically closely linked to the
degree of product market regulation. OECD
composite indicators on product market
regulation that relate to the status quo in the late
1990s suggest that acceding countries have
moved on fairly quickly with product market
deregulation.40 The ongoing adoption of the
single market acquis has been instrumental in
advancing this process. Still, a special issue for
acceding countries in this regard should be
mentioned, namely that of administered prices,
which have a relatively high share in the
consumer baskets of some of these countries.
This may insert an element of inflexibility into
product markets. The analysis of product
market flexibility would benefit from further
deepening in the future.
40 Unfortunately, no updates of these indexes are available.38
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Minimum Minimum Replacement Maximum Total active labour
wage wage ratio1) duration2) expenditure market policies
(euro p/month)  (% of av. wage) (%) (months) (% of GDP in 2001) (% of GDP in 2001)
Central Europe
Czech Republic 199 47 50   6-12 0.31    (1999) 0.19    (1999)
Hungary 212 56 64   3-12 0.56    (1997) 0.40    (1997)
Poland 201 39 40 12-24 1.71    (1996) 0.49    (1996)
Slovakia 118 37 60   6-12 0.54    (1996) 0.56    (1996)
Slovenia 451 43 63   3-24 0.89    (1998) 0.83    (1998)
Baltics
Estonia 138 42 50   6-12 0.13 0.06
Latvia 116 40 50 9 0.50 0.14
Lithuania 125 47 253) n.a. 0.15 0.12
EU average 60 1.73 1.16
Table 5 Labour market welfare systems in acceding countries
(January 2003, unless otherwise specified)
Sources: ECB staff compilation based on Eurostat (2003), OECD (2003), Riboud et al. (2002), Cazes (2002).
1) Initial benefit level divided by previous earned income.
2) Duration is typically a function of the worker’s contributive history.
3) Lithuania’s unemployment benefits do not follow an insurance principle: they are either a flat rate (state supported income) or variable
up to one-fourth of the average gross wage.
The degree of labour market flexibility differs
across acceding countries. Indeed, the
assessment critically depends on which
indicators one chooses to focus upon. Drawing
conclusions from labour market flexibility
indicators is, moreover, particularly difficult in
the case of acceding countries since the ongoing
process of transition may have a significant
effect on these indicators. Despite these
caveats, a number of common features emerge.
Labour turnover, which had been particularly
high in the first half of the 1990s, has since
been decreasing in most cases to reach levels
that are more comparable with those prevailing
in current EU countries. Workers in many
acceding countries remain on average a shorter
time in their jobs compared with workers in the
OECD countries. This is particularly the case in
Estonia, which displays the highest proportion
of workers with a short job tenure (less than
one year) and the smallest share of workers
with long job tenure (more than ten years),
while lengthy average job tenures point towards
some limitations to labour market flexibility in
Slovenia and Poland.
At an individual country level, labour markets
in acceding countries differ in their degree of
flexibility across the range of institutional
features reviewed here. Estonia and Hungary
appear to have the most flexible labour markets,
underpinned by relatively weak labour
protection legislation, the limited role of trade
unions, low levels of social protection and a
high degree of wage flexibility. Hungary has
seen, however, substantial pay increases in
recent years and suffers from one of the highest
taxation rates on labour. In addition, the job
turnover rate is particularly high in Estonia. In
contrast, for the Czech Republic, Poland,
Slovakia and to some extent also Slovenia,
several indicators, such as the wage bargaining
structure and the generosity of their social
benefit systems, suggest that their labour
markets may be more rigid.
It is difficult to project future trends in labour
market flexibility and mobility. Given the high
share of long-term unemployment, however, it
is clear that the high levels of structural
unemployment in a number of acceding
countries are likely to persist for some time.
The main question with regard to future39
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developments appears to be to what extent
acceding countries will experience stronger
upward real wage pressures in the wake of EU
entry, as regulations and labour standards will
tend to become more comparable with the EU. A
further issue is how prospective participation in
the euro area would affect wage developments,
in particular in a catching-up setting. However,
wage pressures within a monetary union are not
likely to be immediate, as the free movement of
persons will be restricted for a period of up to
five (and in some cases seven) years after EU
accession for several countries. This issue will
be discussed in more depth later in the paper.41
Cross-border labour mobility between current
and new Member States is also to be limited by a
transitional arrangement agreed in the context of
the accession negotiations. For the first two
years after accession, Member States will accept
workers from the new Member States according
to national rules (the transitional agreement does
not apply, however, to Cyprus and Malta). Two
years after accession, the Commission will report
on the situation and Member States will have to
announce the system they wish to use from then
on, which could be applied for a further three
years. Following this period, the remaining
Member States that restrict access to their labour
markets will again be invited to open their labour
markets entirely. Only if a Member State can
show serious disturbances in its labour market,
or the threat of such disturbances, will it be able
to continue to require work permits for a
maximum of a further two years. The right of
establishment is not affected by this transitional
period, and people will also be completely free to
deliver services across borders as self-employed
persons or as companies. Austria and Germany,
however, have the right to apply measures to
address serious disturbances or the threat thereof
in specific sensitive service sectors on their
labour markets, which could arise in certain
regions from the cross-border provision of
services.
At this stage it is difficult to foresee what the
likely impact of this transitional arrangement
will be on limiting cross-border labour
mobility, as it will ultimately depend on how
liberal the national measures of the current
Member States turn out to be. In the past, when
Spain and Portugal entered the EU, the phasing-
in period of seven-ten years was subsequently
shortened. In fact, in some Member States full
labour market access may occur immediately
upon accession. Moreover, in a declaration
attached to the Accession Treaty, current
Member States have committed themselves to
granting increased labour market access under
national law, with a view to speeding up the
approximation to the acquis.
2.3.4 FINANCIAL SECTOR INTEGRATION
A high degree of financial integration has been
stressed by some authors as conducive to the
sustainability of a monetary union as, in
combination with sound and well-developed
financial markets, it is expected to help
smoothen the impact of asymmetric shocks by
facilitating cross-border flows of capital.42
Within the “new” OCA theory, financial
integration is often seen to include the similarity
of financial structures, institutions and
legislation, because similar structural features,
including the financing pattern of private
enterprises (i.e. share of bank loans to total
liabilities) and balance sheets of households
(i.e. share of mortgage payments to total
payments), are seen to increase and synchronise
the effectiveness by which monetary policy is
transmitted to the real economy. Thus, financial
integration can also be expected to contribute to
the better functioning of a monetary union.43 To
the extent that financial integration includes
41 See especially Section 2.3.7.
42 See Ingram (1973), Scitovsky (1966). Mundell (1973) takes this argument
a step further by suggesting that, under full financial market integration,
countries which are exposed to asymmetric shocks may particularly profit
from monetary unification. The idea underlying this argument is that using
a common currency will facilitate portfolio diversification, which allows
countries to adjust more smoothly and at lower costs to asymmetric real
shocks, owing to mutual claims on each other’s resources.
43 In this context, it should be noted that financial integration was regarded
as necessary for the euro area to ensure a comparable implementation of
the single monetary policy in EMU. For an overview of the empirical
literature with respect to financial integration in the euro area, see
Mongelli (2002).40
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similar supervisory and regulatory frameworks,
it could also contribute to greater financial
stability.
Overall, the degree of financial integration
between acceding countries and the euro area
appears to be high, although considerable
differences exist across indicators and
countries. As for capital flows, virtually all
acceding countries have experienced large and
increasing inflows in recent years. By far the
largest component of these flows is foreign
direct investment, which has accounted for
approximately two-thirds of all capital flows to
acceding countries in recent years. The EU
plays a very important role as a source of such
FDI: in 2000, approximately 80% of FDI
inflows originated from EU Member States. As
a consequence, cross-border ownership has
increased substantially both in the real sector
and in the financial sector (see also below).
Moreover, the convergence of interest rates to
levels prevailing in the euro area has been
significant, and spreads between deposit and
lending rates have declined to euro area levels
in recent years (see Chart 15). However,
significant differences at the country level
Chart 15 Deposit and lending interest rates
(2002)
(percentages)
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Chart 16 Size of the banking sector (2002)
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Sources: IMF and national central banks.
continue to exist. For example, deposit/lending
spreads are considerably higher in Latvia and
Slovenia than in the euro area, and are close to
twice as high in Lithuania and Poland.
Acceding countries also seem to be highly
integrated when the similarity of their financial
structures and institutions is considered. This is
largely a result of the implementation of the
acquis communautaire and the high degree of
market integration.
The level of financial intermediation, however,
remains low in most acceding countries (see
Chart 16), although banking assets as a ratio to
GDP have risen in recent years. Only Cyprus
and Malta have reached a level comparable with
the euro area average. The low depth of
financial intermediation partly reflects moderate
GDP per capita levels. More importantly,
though, it is due to the relatively short history
of banking sectors and the transition process,
which included bank consolidation, gradually
evolving track records of new companies
and private households, and a strong presence
of foreign-owned companies. Financial
intermediation can be expected to rise more
swiftly in the period ahead, as the transition41
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process nears completion and the catching-up
process advances. At the current juncture,
intermediation is driven in particular by
increased leverage of SMEs and households.
Banking sector soundness has substantially
improved in most acceding countries in recent
years. Capitalisation, profitability and asset
quality have strengthened considerably, in
particular in the Czech Republic and in
Hungary. Poland is somewhat an exception to
the general picture, both in terms of profitability
and with regard to the share of non-performing
loans, which is apparently to a large extent due
to the very low growth phase in 2001 and 2002.
Moreover, in some country cases, the existence
of currency mismatches does warrant attention
from a financial stability viewpoint before the
ultimate adoption of the euro.
Taken together, all these observations imply
that monetary transmission through interest and
credit channels has become more effective in
most acceding countries owing to improved
banking sector soundness, but is still
constrained as a consequence of the low depth
of financial intermediation.
Another basic feature of acceding countries’
financial markets is the dominance of the
banking sector over capital markets, a feature
which is pronounced in all ten countries. Again,
this is both the result of development levels and
transition strategies that mostly focused on
rehabilitating the banking system; attempts in
some countries to foster capital market
development, however, were only partially
successful. This is particularly true for the
corporate bond market, which is in its infancy
in all acceding countries, and for the equity
market, which has made limited headway only
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
While the trading volume on these markets has
increased, it is indicative that the volume of new
equity capital raised through these markets has
remained negligible. Concerning other financial
market segments, liquid foreign exchange
markets have developed in four acceding
countries, namely in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland (both spot and forward
markets) as well as in Slovakia (spot market).
Government bill and bond markets are well
developed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland.44
A further characteristic of financial systems in
acceding countries is substantial foreign
ownership, which can be observed in all market
segments, but mostly in the banking sector.
Foreigners, mostly from EU countries, own in
seven out of ten countries more than 80% of the
total assets of commercial banks, which is well
above the share of cross-border ownership in
the EU. At a country level, Estonia, Lithuania,
Malta and Slovakia have the highest foreign-
owned share of total assets, compared with
Cyprus and Slovenia, which have the lowest
share (see Table 6). The strong presence of
foreign-owned banks has been instrumental in
broadly improving the performance of banks in
acceding countries. Foreign ownership will
transform but not necessarily mitigate
supervision challenges, in particular upon EU
accession, when the home country principle
takes effect for branches established in
acceding countries. In many cases, subsidiaries
and branches in acceding countries only account
for a small fraction of the balance sheets of the
parent banks, while at the same time being of
systemic relevance for the acceding countries’
financial systems. This raises a need for
strengthened cooperation between home and
host supervisory authorities, for instance in the
exchange of information and in potential crisis
management. Foreigners, in particular from the
EU, play a significant role in stock markets in
the acceding countries, partly because market
deepening has typically been closely linked to
privatisation, a process in which foreign
investors have been at the forefront. Similarly,
euro area investors play a substantial role in the
fixed income markets and hold a large share of
acceding countries’ government bonds.
44 It is probably fair to say that the development of equity and corporate bond
markets has a less direct bearing for the timing of monetary union
participation. Still, this analysis is presented here to complete the picture.42
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Looking ahead, financial integration in acceding
countries is expected to increase further.
Capital flows will increase as capital account
liberalisation is fully concluded and EU
accession increases confidence and reduces
risks. Interest rate spreads can be expected
to narrow, as financial sectors become more
efficient over time. Furthermore, with respect to
financial structures and institutions, further
progress can be expected, with the adjustments
arising from the acquis communautaire and
central bank cooperation with the Eurosystem
certainly representing a driving force.
In this context, it is worth recalling that all
acceding countries will implement and enforce
the acquis as from the date of accession, with
only a few, temporary exceptions. In particular,
under the chapter “free movement of capital”,
negotiations have been closed with some
transitional arrangements on real estate
investments (Slovenia), secondary residence
investments (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Cyprus)45 and agricultural land and
forest investments (Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and
Poland). Under the chapter “freedom to provide
services”, some specific transitional
arrangements have been granted in the financial
sector regarding full compliance with the acquis
of the cooperative credit institutions (Cyprus,
Hungary and Poland), savings and loans
Share of total
Number of assets being
commercial Of which: foreign-owned
banks foreign-owned (as a %)
Cyprus 13 5 13
Czech Republic 37 26 86
Estonia 7 4 99
Hungary 39 27 87
Latvia 19 12 47
Lithuania 14 4 94
Malta 13 10 99
Poland 59 45 78
Slovakia 18 15 96
Slovenia 22 6 35
Table 6 Foreign ownership of banks
(2002)
Sources: EBRD, national central banks and/or national supervisory authorities.
undertakings (Slovenia), deposit guarantee
schemes (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Slovenia) and investor compensation schemes
(Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia). Owing to their specific
nature as well as their limited duration and
scope, the transitional arrangements will not
genuinely affect further the financial integration
of the acceding countries.
Finally, the experience of the current euro area
countries suggests that the eventual adoption of
the single currency will give a further boost to
deepening financial integration, increasing the
homogeneity of structures and the efficiency of
banks and capital markets.
2.3.5 REAL CONVERGENCE AND STRUCTURAL
DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Real convergence, i.e. the catching-up of
income levels and the adjustment of real
economic structures to those prevailing in the
euro area, is one of the key economic
characteristics of acceding countries. While
differences in income levels and some
differences in economic structures can, in
principle, be compatible with participation in a
45 Malta has been granted the right to maintain on a permanent basis its
national legislation regarding the acquisition of secondary residences.43
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monetary union, such differences can have
important implications for the appropriateness
of the single monetary policy to individual
members. In particular, real convergence is
likely to be reflected in differences in economic
dynamics. Differences in economic dynamics
between members are increasingly regarded as
one of the main potential costs of a monetary
union. If such differences are substantial
and persistent, abandoning an independent
monetary policy as a stabilisation instrument
may entail welfare losses. Inappropriate
macroeconomic policies would exacerbate
periods of overheating or downturns, lead
to boom-bust cycles, and may bring about
higher average unemployment over time
through hysteresis effects. This section
explores these considerations for the current
acceding countries.
Over the past 13 years, economic growth in
most acceding countries has developed quite
differently from the euro area, with the
exception of Cyprus and Malta.46 Following
initial transformational recessions in the early
1990s, most acceding economies have expanded
faster than the euro area, experienced sharper
cyclical fluctuations and have been subject to
several major idiosyncratic shocks, including
stabilisation crises. The important question is
whether these structural differences in the
pattern of economic dynamics between acceding
countries and the euro area will remain
significant beyond 2007-2009, which is the
target period of many acceding countries for
euro area entry. The answer to this question is
mostly empirical. The following analysis
examines the basic properties of output dynamics
since 1996 (the first half of the decade, by
contrast, was mostly shaped by systemic
transformation) and aims to assess structural
differences vis-à-vis the euro area. Note that
owing to the short time series, all findings have to
be taken with caution and estimates warrant
updating as new data become available.
In this analysis, three features stand out, all of
which have a bearing on the choice of timing of
euro area entry and which will be briefly
addressed in this section: growth rates are
persistently higher in acceding countries, as are
growth fluctuations (i.e. amplitudes of
upswings and downturns), while business
cycles are not always closely synchronised with
the euro area.
A convenient way of condensing these
differences into a single indicator is Theil’s
inequality coefficient. This coefficient
measures a scaled root mean squared difference
between two series. It takes values between
zero (perfect fit) and unity. The statistic
provides two important benefits. First, it allows
the comparison of different pairs of variables at
different scales, with respect to a broad concept
of inequality. Second, inequality of time series
can be decomposed into its main statistical
factors, i.e. mean difference, difference in
variability and lack of correlation.
Chart 17 shows GDP growth inequality as
measured by Theil’s inequality coefficients
relative to the euro area for three groups
over the period 1996 to mid-2003, namely the
CEE (Central and Eastern European) acceding
countries, euro area peripheral countries (Greece
and Portugal), and the so-called euro area pre-ins
(United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark).47
It turns out that inequality is on average higher
for acceding countries (mean coefficient 0.43)
than for the peripherals (0.32) and the
pre-ins (0.24). Moreover, there has been
considerable divergence in inequality among
acceding countries. The countries with
economic dynamics most similar to the euro
area are Hungary (coefficient: 0.27), Slovenia
(0.31) and Poland (0.40). Meanwhile, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania post
the largest differences. Chart 18 repeats the
exercise using Germany as a reference. Results
on the relative inequality of the acceding
countries, peripherals and pre-ins are similar to
46 In this section the term “acceding countries” refers to the eight Central
and Eastern European acceding countries (thus not including
Cyprus and Malta).
47 This part of the analysis excludes Ireland, since quarterly GDP data
stretching back to 1996 are not available for this country.44
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Chart 17 Theil’s inequality coefficients for
growth between various countries and the
euro area
(based on year-on-year real GDP growth rates, 1996-
2003Q2)
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Chart 18 Theil’s inequality coefficients for
growth between various countries and
Germany
(based on year-on-year real GDP growth rates, 1996-
2003Q2)
Sources: ECB staff calculations.

























LT LV EE SK CZ PL SI HU GR PT UK SE DK ES NL FR IT
those obtained against the euro area benchmark.
However, two additional findings are of
interest. First, inequality versus Germany is
greater than versus the euro area in all cases,
suggesting that there is an issue of dispersion
among euro area countries in addition to the
difference between different “blocks”. Second,
one can add France, Italy, the Netherlands and
Spain individually as an additional control. The
inequality of these countries versus Germany is
comparable to that of the pre-ins, but well
below that of the acceding countries.
What explains these inequalities? The statistical
components of different growth behaviour are
shown in Charts 19 and 20. Technically
speaking, they reveal how inequality is related
to different means, different variances and a
lack of covariance between the individual
countries and the euro area (or Germany). When
looking at inequality versus the euro area, it is
striking that for all country groups the
covariance of growth with the euro area is
imperfect and roughly of a similar size. This
difference may reflect lack of cycle synchrony,
perhaps arising from idiosyncratic shocks.
There is a considerable difference in the means
and, to a lesser extent, variances of the separate
country groups, however. Thus, for the pre-ins
neither means nor variances put economic
growth far from that of the euro area. The
peripheral countries add the difference in mean
growth as a significant component of
inequality. The CEE countries exhibit an even
more sizeable mean difference and are
additionally subject to a higher level of
variance, suggesting that their trend growth and
cycle amplitudes tend to be larger. The
inequality versus Germany features mean
growth difference as a prominent characteristic
of all country groups, including the large
current “euro-ins”. However, similar to the euro
area benchmark, the acceding countries tend to
have a relatively higher variability of output.
- Higher growth rates
An obvious feature of the data is that real GDP
has expanded considerably faster in the
acceding countries than in the euro area over the
past few years. On average, the acceding
countries posted GDP growth rates of 4.1%
from 1996 to mid-2003, compared with 2.3% in
the euro area, 2.7% and 3.6%% in Portugal and
Greece, respectively, and from 2.3% to 2.8% on
average in Denmark, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Within the group of acceding
countries, the Czech Republic is a clear outlier,
with real GDP expanding by only 1.7% on
average per year due to the severe stabilisation
crisis of 1997-99 (see Chart 21).
Higher growth rates in acceding countries
compared with the euro area can mainly be45
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Chart 19 Differences in GDP growth
compared to the euro area
(Theil’s inequality coefficients and components, 1996-
2003Q2, based on year-on-year GDP growth rates)











due to covariance difference
due to variance difference
due to mean difference
CEE 8 peripherals pre-ins
Chart 20 Differences in GDP growth
compared to Germany
(Theil’s inequality coefficients and components, 1996-
2003Q2, based on year-on-year GDP growth rates)
Sources: ECB staff calculations.
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explained by the catching-up of these
economies, as well as initially by the recovery
from the “transformational recession” of the
first half of the 1990s. While higher growth is
needed to converge with the per capita income
levels in the euro area, such structural
differences in economic dynamics may increase
the stabilisation costs that an acceding country
would incur if it abandoned its own monetary
policy. Different long-term growth rates not
only imply higher inflation rates, for example
through the Balassa-Samuelson effect; there is
also a risk of inappropriately low nominal, and
thus real, short-term interest rates. In
combination with a high marginal return on
capital, these lower interest rates could
potentially fuel a credit boom that, owing to
inevitable supply-side constraints facing the
investment demands, would give rise to asset
bubbles and boom-bust cycles (for further
details, see also the next section).
- Higher output fluctuations
On the heels of faster economic growth,
most acceding countries have also experienced
wider output fluctuations. The average
standard deviation of real GDP growth
was 2.4 percentage points in the acceding
countries from 1996 to mid-2003, higher than in
the euro area and the euro area periphery (with
respectively 1.3 and 1.5 percentage points). The
variance of individual countries was on average
larger in acceding countries than in the euro
area, although the standard deviations are
scattered in a broad range from 1.4% in
Hungary and Slovenia to 3.6% in Estonia and
Lithuania. The five central European economies
together, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Chart 21 GDP growth and standard
deviations in Europe
(GDP, annual percentage change, 1996-mid-2003)
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Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, posted on
average a much smaller standard deviation (1.9
percentage points) than the Baltic countries (3.3
percentage points). This finding partly reflects
the recession in the aftermath of the Russian
crisis of 1998 and the subsequent recovery, but
may also have to do with country size.
Higher output fluctuation in acceding countries
compared with the euro area can be mainly
explained by the fact that the transition process
and the implementation of structural reforms
have followed a fairly uneven path. Moreover,
acceding countries have experienced only
imperfect access to international capital markets
as they have been exposed to stronger changes
in investor sentiment. Most importantly, high
investment ratios in most acceding countries,
combined with the fact that capital spending
tends to be more cyclical than consumption,
suggests that during the catching-up period,
growth fluctuations will remain larger.
Interestingly, the growth differential between
the euro area and acceding countries has not
diminished over the sample period. A period of
narrowing growth differences from 1996 to
1999 has given way to a renewed divergence
over the past few years (see Chart 22). With
respect to monetary policy, large differences in
output fluctuations could imply that in an
enlarged euro area, monetary policy would not
be sufficiently counter-cyclical for those
countries with higher fluctuations.
In this context, however, it must first be
investigated whether monetary policy has
played a useful stabilisation role, or whether it
has instead added to cyclical fluctuations.
Given the predominant importance of the
exchange rate channel in the transmission of
monetary impulses to the real economy (interest
and credit channels play a limited role as a result
of the low degree of financial intermediation),
the issue to be considered is whether exchange
rate fluctuations have been a useful adjustment
tool in dealing with adverse shocks – in which
case they would stabilise domestic output
growth – or whether they have disrupted trade
and financial relations and have thereby
possibly magnified domestic output
fluctuations. Obviously, only in the first case
would the abandoning of the exchange rate tool
prove costly. Background analysis on this
particular issue suggests that the exchange rate
has indeed played a role as a shock absorber,
which has been larger in countries with flexible
exchange rate regimes than in countries
with tight exchange rate management.48 This
conclusion is based on the finding that in
countries with more flexible exchange rate
arrangements, both nominal and real exchange
rates have reacted to shocks, rather than having
led to them. This might support the view that
flexible exchange rates are an efficient tool for
adjusting to asymmetric shocks, also reflecting
the fact that countries with more rigid regimes
were less able to adjust the real exchange rate to
growth differentials and fluctuations.
- Business cycle synchronisation
While acceding countries have on average
higher and more volatile growth rates than the
euro area, this does not necessarily imply
divergent business cycles, which is another
Chart 22 GDP growth
(quarterly data, annual percentage changes)
Source: Eurostat.





























Chart 23 Correlation of de-trended GDP
growth with the euro area
(based on quarterly year-on-year growth rates over 1996-
mid-2003)
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important factor when discussing whether
countries are already well prepared to join the
monetary union and to abandon flexible
exchange rates. Strongly correlated cyclical
swings across countries imply that countries are
exposed to similar shocks and respond in a
similar way.
With regard to the symmetry of economic
fluctuations, the assessment is diverse across
countries and benchmarks. Furthermore,
correlation needs to be estimated and is thus
more subject to judgement. The following
analysis uses again data from 1996 until mid-
2003 as well as four different measures to
estimate correlation, in particular de-trended
GDP growth, short-term trends in industrial
output growth, estimated broad cycle
components, and supply and demand shocks as
identified by a structural VAR model. These
approaches have complementary advantages
and drawbacks, suggesting that results that
broadly hold across methods might be
reasonably robust and credible.49
The correlation coefficients of de-trended
annual GDP growth (at a quarterly frequency)
are presented in Chart 23.50 The “euro pre-ins”
(Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom)
post the highest correlation with the euro area at
an (un-weighted) average of 0.45. They are
followed by a correlation coefficient of 0.21 for
the acceding countries and of 0.21 as well
for the two peripheral euro area economies
(Portugal and Greece). Among individual
acceding countries, the high correlation of
Hungary and Slovenia with the euro area stands
out.
The disadvantage of using GDP correlation to
capture cycle synchrony is that even after long-
term trend adjustment, the coefficients may be
biased owing to technical correlation. In
particular, the correlation of the central
European economies with Germany may reflect
similar weather conditions and calendar factors.
A standard way of avoiding the problem is to
use filters to extract the short-term GDP trends
(through moving averages or medians).
However, the available times series are too
short (30 observations) to do this in a
meaningful way. Monthly data, which provide
more observations, are better suited for such
smoothing. They additionally allow to capture
short-term dynamics that may be left unnoticed
with lower frequency data, such as GDP series,
that are available on a quarterly or annual basis.
The most popular proxy for monthly activity is
industrial production. Data are more complete
and have a longer history than GDP data. In
particular, Ireland can now be included in the
subsequent analysis. In addition, industry
represents a substantial share of GDP in
the acceding countries of central and eastern
Europe (about 32% on average in 2002), and is
typically the most decisive sector for cyclical
dynamics. This series provides enough
observations to extract a short-term trend from
monthly growth data using a Hodrick-Prescott
filter (with a smoothing factor of 100). Given
the higher frequency of the data, this short-
term trend is used as a proxy for cyclical
fluctuations.
49 It should borne in mind that estimated correlation coefficients for
Greece, Ireland and Portugal with the euro area – hereafter reported –
may be positively biased given that these countries are euro area Member
States themselves. However, since they account for a small share of euro
area GDP, this bias is unlikely to be large. For a recent other study of
business cycle synchronisation between euro area countries and
acceding countries, see Darvas and Szapáry (2004).
50 GDP series are de-trended by subtracting a quasi linear trend estimated
by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 14,000.48
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Chart 24 shows correlation coefficients for
this measure. As in the GDP analysis, the
correlation between the euro area and the three
“euro pre-ins” is strongest with an average (un-
weighted) coefficient of 0.79. It is about 0.39
for the three euro area peripheral economies.
The acceding countries from central and eastern
Europe post an even higher average correlation
coefficient of 0.47. However, the dispersion of
the group is very wide. Hungary stands out with
a coefficient of 0.94, which is the highest of all
countries in the panel. The industry short-term
trends of Slovenia, Poland and Estonia have
also been strongly correlated with the euro area.
The Czech Republic and Latvia post some
positive correlation in their industry short-term
trend with the euro area. Interestingly, unlike in
the case of GDP, Slovakia is now positively
correlated with the euro area. However,
Lithuania remains negatively correlated.
It comes as no surprise that industry cycles are
more closely aligned than GDP for all country
groups. Merchandise trade integration between
the euro area and the acceding countries from
central and eastern Europe is high and the bulk
of foreign direct investment from West to East
is also mostly in the manufacturing sector.
Finally, manufacturing activity across countries
is subject to global cycles, particularly in
inventory and investment spending. However,
for all of these reasons, correlation of industry
data may overstate the co-movements of the
overall economies. And it is the latter that
should matter for monetary policy.
Therefore a broad indicator for the business
cycle is additionally estimated on a monthly
basis. Compared with simple GDP growth, this
has the advantage of avoiding correlation owing
to joined quarterly volatility and of examining
dynamics at a higher frequency. In addition,
compared with the monthly industrial
production series, it incorporates the dynamics
of more sectors. Indeed, non-tradables sectors,
such as retail services and construction, often
follow dynamics that are more dependent on
idiosyncratic domestic growth factors, such as
monetary conditions or fiscal policy.
Three separate monthly indicator sets are used
for each country to distil from them a joined
cyclical factor: the annual growth of industrial
production, the annual growth of retail sales
volumes, and the annual growth of construction
output. In some countries where not all data
were available, surveys have been used to
capture retail and construction activity.51 The
joined cyclical component has been estimated
by using a state-space model of the Stock and
Watson (1991) type that identifies the cycle as a
joined linear component of all sectoral cycles.
This component can then be smoothed again by
a Hodrick-Prescott filter to rid it of short-term
volatility.
The importance of looking at the broad cycle
estimates rather than industry alone can be
demonstrated by the example of the Czech
Republic (see Charts 25 to 28 below). The chart
of Czech and euro area industry growth shows
that both economies have been at least broadly
correlated over the sample period. The chart of
the estimated joint cycle component of industry,
construction and retail sales, however, suggests
otherwise and is more in line with popular
perceptions or GDP data. While the Czech
Republic suffered a deep downturn in 1998-
51 Series are reduced by dividing them by their respective standard
deviation.
Chart 24 Correlation of short-term
industrial output growth trends with the
euro area
(based on quarterly year-on-year growth rates over 1996-
mid-2003)
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1999 that affected all sectors, the euro area’s
dip was limited to industry, and the economy as
a whole remained close to a cyclical high. Then
in 2000-2001, when the euro area cycle
weakened, the Czech Republic recovered on a
broad basis.
Thus the smoothed broad cycle estimates seem
to be a particularly useful tool for estimating the
symmetry of economic fluctuations. Correlation
coefficients have been computed and are
Chart 25 Czech and euro area industrial
production






















Chart 26 Czech and euro area broad cycle























Source: ECB staff calculations.
presented in Chart 29. They deliver several
important messages:
The (un-weighted) average of the correlation
coefficients of the central and eastern European
acceding countries with the euro area falls
substantially to just 0.13. The coefficient of the
“euro pre-ins” stands at 0.43, while the
peripheral euro area countries still show a high
correlation of 0.51. This difference relative to
industry data is not too surprising, however.
Chart 27 Sector growth and broad cycle in
the Czech Republic
(year-on-year growth rates and HP smoothed estimates by
the Kalman filter for the broad cycle; as a % and
normalised)
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Chart 28 Sector growth and broad cycle in
the euro area
(year-on-year growth rates and HP smoothed estimates by
the Kalman filter for the broad cycle; as a % and
normalised)
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Given the geographic proximity, the GDP and
industrial production correlations between the
euro area and acceding countries from central
and eastern Europe have possibly been biased to
the high side by e.g. joined calendar and
weather factors.
All the above analyses have looked at the
correlation of various measures of aggregate
output. A popular alternative is to use time
series of both GDP and the GDP deflator in
order to distinguish and identify aggregate
demand and supply shocks via a structural VAR
model of the Blanchard-Quah (1989) type.52
The correlation of the estimated demand and
supply shocks for the CEE acceding countries,
the “euro peripherals” and the “euro pre-ins”
has been plotted in Chart 30. Countries where
both demand and supply shocks are positively
correlated with the euro area are located in the
upper right quadrant of the plot. This group
includes four countries whose de-trended GDP
growth and industrial output growth trends
were found to be positively correlated with
the euro area, namely the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Latvia and Slovenia. Interestingly,
Estonia, Hungary and Poland are found to be
positively correlated with the euro area in terms
of their supply shocks, but not in terms of
demand shocks. The euro peripherals,
particularly Greece, are found to be poorly
correlated with the euro area, while the UK and
Sweden exhibit positive correlation for supply
shocks but negative correlation for demand
shocks, similar to Lithuania and Slovakia.
To sum up, the correlation of economic
fluctuations with the euro area seems overall
weaker for the acceding countries from central
and eastern Europe than for the euro pre-ins.
However, this correlation is by and large not
substantially worse than that of the peripheral
euro area economies. Moreover, at the
individual country level, the synchronisation
of business cycles varies considerably. As for
52 For an earlier analysis along these methodological lines, see Fidrmuc and
Korhonen (2003), as well as Bayoumi (1992) or Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993) for an application to euro area countries. Compare
also Frenkel and Nickel (2002). Results reported are updates from
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) and kindly provided by Iikka Korhonen,
whose contribution is gratefully acknowledged. Estimations are based on
quarterly y-o-y real GDP and y-o-y GDP deflator growth rates (derived
from nominal GDP data). Data were taken from the International
Financial Statistics database and sampled over 1996 to mid-2003. The
optimal lag length of the bi-variate VARs was almost one (occasionally
two). Given the short size of the sample, absence of cointegration
between the series was not tested. It is worth stressing that the Blanchard-
Quah decomposition, while being frequently used in the empirical
literature on optimal curreny areas, was seriously challenged by Lippi and
Reichlin (1993, 1994). Given the long-run neutrality condition, these
authors showed that the decomposition of a VAR’s residuals into
structural shocks is unique only if all the information available to agents
is observable by the econometrician in the data.
Chart 29 Correlation of broad cyclical
trends with the euro area
(correlation coefficients of cyclical components estimated
by the Kalman filter, monthly data, 1996-mid-2003)
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Chart 30 Shock symmetry with the euro
area
(correlation coefficients of estimated supply shocks (x-axis)
and demand shocks (y-axis) from 1996 to mid-2003)



































Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia, output
fluctuations seem to be rather symmetric with
the euro area, and cycle correlation is usually
within the range of – and sometimes higher
than – that of the euro area peripherals, such
as Portugal and Greece. Business cycle
synchronisation with the euro area is, however,
sometimes estimated to be lower in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, mainly due to currency
turbulence and stabilisation episodes in the late
1990s. Lithuania always shows a negative
correlation of economic fluctuations or of
demand shocks with the euro area, which might
be explained by rather different economic
structures and the relatively low degree of trade
integration with the euro area. Results for
Estonia were not robust across methods.
Looking ahead, there are reasons to believe that
business cycle synchronisation between the
central and eastern European acceding countries
and euro area countries will improve over the
next few years, owing to further integration
with the euro area, but that this will only be a
gradual development. Nevertheless, different
trends in growth rates and output fluctuation are
likely to persist in the medium to longer term.
2.3.6 ADJUSTING INTEREST RATES TO EURO
AREA LEVELS
In recent years, nominal interest rates have been
gradually reduced in most acceding countries,
mainly reflecting the decline in inflation
outcomes and expectations. Nevertheless,
policy interest rates are still well above the level
of the euro area in most acceding countries (see
Chart 31). In Hungary interest rate spreads
currently amount to 1050 basis points, in
Slovakia 400 basis points, in Poland 325 basis
points and in Slovenia 275 basis points. Only in
the Czech Republic is the spread zero.
The decreasing trend in policy interest rates has
largely come to a halt since mid-2003 in most
acceding countries, and Hungary has actually
witnessed a significant reversal, as policy
interest rates were raised by 300 basis points to
9.5% in June and by another 300 basis points to
12.5% in November 2003.
Given the current policy interest rate spreads,
most countries would have to substantially cut
interest rates towards the euro area level within
a time span of a few years, if they were to join
the euro area a few years after EU accession.
The current difference in short-term interest
rates between acceding countries and the euro
area thus raises a key issue: will and should
acceding countries have the same nominal
interest rates as the euro area and, if so, how
quickly should the convergence of nominal
interest rates proceed? The obvious implication
of monetary union and trend real exchange rate
appreciation suggests that, in the wake of
nominal interest rate convergence, real interest
rates may fall below euro area levels. A low
level of capital stock, presumed high returns on
new capital and (more empirically) the
outperformance of equity markets suggest that
real rates should however be higher.
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A rapid reduction in nominal interest rates in
the run-up to euro area membership might also
be inappropriate for some acceding countries,
as inflation developments and cyclical
conditions might instead call for tighter
monetary conditions. In addition, the alignment
of interest rates with those in the euro area
would very likely exert, with a time lag, further
upward pressures on inflation. In fact, a sharp
reduction in real interest rates would potentially
53 See Kröger and Redonnet (2002). However, this scenario depends
crucially on the efficiency of the interest rate channel, which may be
comparatively weak in most acceding countries. In this respect,
downward pressures on nominal interest rates would further have to be
fully passed onto other interest rates that have a bearing on domestic
investment and consumption, such as those on domestic loans.
trigger – through lower costs of borrowing –
higher investment and greater consumption in
acceding countries. To the extent that self-
correcting mechanisms only become effective in
the medium term, lower interest rates may lead
to an overheating of the economy, in particular
as inflationary pressures would result in even
lower real interest rates. This, in turn, could
easily translate into serious imbalances in
sectors such as real estate and equity markets.53
A further decline in interest rates is by now
widely expected and discounted in the bond
markets. In November 2003, while the 1-month
money market yields still showed an average
spread of 380 bps, the spreads were already
narrower at a mean of 180 bps for 5-year
maturity bonds (see Charts 32 and 33).
Most importantly, the implied 5-year forward
interest rate in five years has converged to euro
area levels in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
while trading at a spread of some 100-150 bps
in Hungary and Poland (see Chart 34). This
difference may well reflect a credit spread or a
Chart 32 1-month money market rates
(percentages)
Chart 33 5-year bond yields
(percentages)































































Chart 34 Implied 5-year forward interest
rate in 5 years
(percentages)































Chart 35 Yield curves
(percentages)












































































3-month 6-month 12-month 5-year 10-year
premium on foreign exchange uncertainty. In
this context it is worth noting that, since around
mid-2003, there has been a pick-up in bond
yields in several acceding countries (see
Chart 35 on yield curves). This increase was
partly driven by international factors (the global
increase in yields) but also aggravated
by regional concerns over fiscal policy, leading
to a more pronounced rise in yields (as well
as spreads compared with euro area bond
yields) in some countries, seemingly in
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Although yields in many acceding countries are
still at a low level compared with other
emerging markets, recent developments show
that the convergence of yields is not necessarily
an irreversible and smooth process, and that
expectations may change in response to
underlying fundamentals as well as to regional
and global developments.
As regards the implications of interest rate
convergence, the experience of catching-up
economies in the euro area may be of relevance.54
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For example in Ireland, monetary conditions
had already eased in the run-up to the adoption
of the euro, which resulted in strong private
sector credit growth and a tangible increase in
housing prices. Moreover, inflation increased
considerably, at times three percentage points
above the euro area average. As fiscal
tightening is the only macroeconomic
instrument available in a monetary union,
Ireland maintained large budget surpluses of
around 4.7% of GDP in 2000 to dampen GDP
growth. It is questionable whether in an
acceding country such a surplus would be
conceivable, given the substantial pressure for
public investment spending and for cushioning
transition-related adverse social consequences
and unemployment (see separate sub-section on
fiscal issues below).
2.3.7 EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS: THE IMPACT OF
CATCHING-UP ON COMPETITIVENESS
Acceding countries are likely to be faced with
the challenge of maintaining competitiveness
and sustainable current account deficits in the
catching-up process over the medium and
longer term. As external adjustments via
nominal exchange rates are no longer possible
in a monetary union, competitiveness concerns
could arise if countries were confronted with an
excessive increase in their relative price level
(e.g. through inappropriately low interest rates
and resulting overheating). The ensuing losses
in competitiveness could no longer be corrected
through devaluation and would instead have to
be corrected through a phase of lower or
perhaps negative wage and price growth, which
may be difficult owing to downwards nominal
rigidities, as discussed above.
The process of catching-up is usually
associated with appreciating real exchange
rates, following relatively high productivity
growth. Real appreciation comes about through
higher inflation, nominal appreciation or a
combination of both. Continuous real
appreciation of acceding countries’ exchange
rates is not a macroeconomic problem, if
matched by productivity growth. However, a
number of acceding countries have exhibited
large current account deficits since the mid-
1990s, even though deficits have tended to fall
somewhat in recent years. In a catching-up
process, current account deficits may be
justified from the perspective of a rational
intertemporal transfer of resources, allowing a
country to finance higher investments, in turn
justified by higher expected returns, or to
smoothen consumption. However, large current
account deficits could also signal potential
complications in terms of deteriorating price
competitiveness. Furthermore, depending on
the financing and indebtedness structure, they
may also be indicative of vulnerability of the
currency to a confidence crisis.
As regards the acceding countries, current
account deficits have been on average
considerably higher in those countries with
fixed exchange rate regimes than with
flexible regimes (see Charts 36 and 37). To
assess whether and, if so, to what extent
current account deficits reflect competitiveness
problems, or whether these imbalances are
driven by more benign factors, it is worth
looking at different real exchange rate
measures, developments in savings and
investment, as well as shares in export markets.
In particular, it would be potentially
problematic if current account deficits were
accompanied by decreasing savings rates rather
than by high investment ratios, which in turn
entail healthier prospects for long-term
sustainable growth. In this context, most
acceding countries have relatively high
investment ratios, on average around 22-24%
of GDP in 2002. In the Baltic countries
investments have been financed, on average, by
a national savings ratio of around 17% of GDP,
resulting in a current account deficit of 7%
of GDP. In the larger acceding countries,
investments have been covered, on average, by
national savings of around 18% of GDP,
resulting in a current account deficit of 4% of
GDP.55
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Chart 36 CEE5 – Savings and investments
(as a percentage of GDP)
Chart 37 Baltics – Savings and
investments
(as a percentage of GDP)
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Chart 39 Market share in euro area imports
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Chart 38 Market share in world exports
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In addition, despite the persistence of relatively
large current account deficits, acceding
countries have been able to expand their
presence in external markets, as evidenced by
the increase in their share of total world exports
from 1.7% in 1997 to 2.3% in 2002. Yet, as
mentioned above, this increase appears to have
been more moderate in countries with fixed
exchange rate regimes than in countries
allowing for exchange rate flexibility (see
Chart 38). The evolution of acceding countries’
market share in euro area imports is similar or
perhaps even more encouraging, rising from
3.2% in 1997 to 4.7% in 2002 (see Chart 39).
Looking ahead, it would be desirable that
progress in transition be in due time
accompanied by a recovery in the contribution
of external demand to GDP growth. Such a
recovery was timidly observed in 1999-2000
but has recently reversed (see Chart 40). This
can, however, be explained to a large extent by
weak economic activity in the euro area. Still, it
goes without saying that current account56
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 10
February 2004






















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20032) 20042)
Baltic States
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
AC-10 average1)
deficits need to be carefully looked at when
assessing their medium-term sustainability,
particularly so in countries with fixed exchange
rate regimes.
Moreover, upon euro area entry, acceding
countries might be confronted with excessive
aggregate demand dynamics owing to declining
short-term nominal and real interest rates,
which could result in inflationary pressures and
an ensuing loss of export competitiveness
leading to current account imbalances. Rising
price levels could also spur wage developments
which, if not matched by productivity growth,
would lead to higher unit labour costs in the
tradable sector. In particular, upon euro area
entry, nominal wages will become more easily
comparable across Member States. Workers in
acceding countries may well push for nominal
wages closer to the level in core Member States,
regardless of actual productivity developments.
While wage pressures in countries such as
Portugal and Spain were rather limited after the
start of EMU, the situation might be different
for most acceding countries, given that they will
have common borders with high-income
countries such as Germany and Austria.
However, it should be borne in mind that the
free movement of persons may be restricted for
a period of up to five (and in exceptional cases
seven) years after EU accession, with the
concrete decisions regarding this to be made at
national level.54 This may dampen pressures for
wage convergence.
As a consequence of wage pressures in a setting
of buoyant domestic demand spurred by low –
and possibly negative – real interest rates,
acceding countries could experience a loss of
competitiveness after joining the euro area.
While participation in monetary union will ease
the external financing constraint, a sustained
widening of external imbalances may lead to a
build-up of external debt that may be
unsustainable in the longer run. In this context,
it is worth noting that the scope of debt-creating
financing of external imbalances might widen
for acceding countries in the medium term, as
privatisation revenues are set to dry up.
Furthermore, foreign direct investment, which
is becoming increasingly dependent on
reinvested profits (as opposed to privatisation),
may be subject to global business conditions
and investor sentiment and, in some cases, an
increasing share of profits accruing from FDI
may be transferred abroad in the future rather
than being reinvested in the country concerned.
2.3.8 FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
Fiscal policy is likely to be a decisive issue for
several acceding countries, in particular with
respect to their strategies that aim at adopting
the euro over the medium term. Upon EU
accession, countries are subject to the EU
Treaty (in particular the excessive deficit
procedure) and the Stability and Growth Pact.55
Additionally, countries have to comply with the
Maastricht criteria before joining the euro area,
according to which their fiscal deficit may not
exceed the threshold of 3% of GDP. However,
currently more than half of the acceding
countries have a fiscal deficit well above this
54 See Section 2.3.3.
55 It should be noted, however, that the EU’s fiscal rules do not foresee
to impose sanctions on non-euro area Member States with excessive
deficits. The rules are less explicit in terms of the pace of fiscal
consolidation. For current euro area Member States, the target is to
achieve cyclically adjusted fiscal positions close to balance by 2006.57
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threshold, amounting on average to 5.1% of
GDP in 2002. Moreover, in some countries the
fiscal situation has deteriorated in 2002, with
Hungary being the most prominent example. Of
course, all figures should be interpreted with
caution, given that they are not yet fully
adjusted to ESA 95 standards and are thereby
not fully comparable.
Against this background, several acceding
countries would have to consolidate their fiscal
balances at a fast pace if they wanted to meet the
fiscal criterion in 2005 as required for an
adoption of the euro in 2007. According to the
2003 PEPs, most acceding countries have
relaxed their medium-term fiscal strategies
compared with 2002’s plans, thereby taking a
more gradual approach than envisaged earlier,
or even postponing significant fiscal
consolidation further into the future. Still, six
countries, namely Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, envisage being
in a position to meet the Maastricht fiscal
criteria by 2005, and Slovakia now intends to
reduce its fiscal deficit to below 3% of GDP in
2006. The remaining countries, the Czech
Republic, Poland and Malta, intend to continue
running public sector deficits of more than 3%
of GDP throughout 2006.
The relaxation of medium-term fiscal strategies
as laid out in the 2003 PEPs raises questions
not only concerning the credibility of these
plans but also as to whether consolidation
efforts are sufficiently ambitious in all
countries concerned. Weak fiscal track records
in some countries add further concerns. The
2003 PEPs show that fiscal slippages are
continuing in a number of countries and that
overruns in 2003 may be considerable in a few
country cases. This pertains mainly to Cyprus,
Malta and the Czech Republic, where fiscal
slippages are in the order of 3.5 percentage
points (ppts), 3.1 ppts and 1.8 ppts of GDP
respectively. Slovenia also expects an overrun
of 0.6 ppt of GDP, which however still implies
a relatively contained deficit of 2% of GDP and
an improvement of 0.6 ppt compared with 2002.
Hungary will also have a budget overrun;
however, its size is unclear, with the
government expecting a slippage of 0.3 ppt of
GDP, while Magyar Nemzeti Bank foresees an
overrun of more that 1 ppt of GDP. In its
Autumn 2003 forecasts, the European
Commission expects slippages of about 0.9 ppt
of GDP on average for all acceding countries.
It is worth noting that overruns in 2003 are
partly due to overly optimistic underlying
assumptions, and partly a consequence of more
expansionary fiscal policy stances than laid out
in the budget frameworks.
Against this backdrop, there is clearly no
ground for concerns that fiscal consolidation
might entail excessive short-term costs in terms
of output losses and temporarily slow real
convergence with the euro area. While it is true
that, in the medium term, fiscal consolidation
might have a positive impact on growth, the
short-term implications of a fast consolidation
on growth are uncertain and could be negative.
However, at the current stage, only Hungary
and Slovakia are planning substantial cuts in
fiscal deficits over the next few years, and their
ambitious programmes are still facing the test of
implementation. An improving global and in
particular European growth environment in
2004 and beyond could be seen as conducive to
stepping up fiscal consolidation efforts in
acceding countries, as increasing external
demand would help set off public consumption
and investment demand. Still, a rapid fiscal
consolidation strategy may face design and
implementation challenges, as acceding
countries are confronted – at the current stage
and in the near future – with many competing
demands on spending and, in some cases, with
pressure to cut direct taxes.
In the coming years, acceding countries will be
exposed to continuing expenditure pressures
arising from the completion of the transition
process, the implementation of the acquis
communautaire (especially in the area of the
environmental acquis, where spending needs
will remain particularly high for a number of
years), the budgetary requirements related
to EU and NATO membership, and pending58
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reforms of the health and pension systems.
Against this backdrop, public investment is
expected to pick up in a number of countries. At
the same time, prospective windfall gains from
interest rate convergence appear to be limited;
even for countries with intermediate levels of
public debt, future savings on interest payments
will be much smaller than in the case of several
of the EU countries which joined the euro area
in 1999. Moreover, given the high tax burden in
some countries, significant tax reforms are
planned, which would have a bearing on
government revenues and fiscal deficits as well.
It should additionally be noted that fiscal
deficits in acceding countries with major fiscal
imbalances seem to be mainly of a structural
nature. This is also indicated by the high share
of mandatory expenditures and by the limited
role of automatic stabilisers in most countries.
Consequently, a recovery in growth, as
expected in most acceding countries from 2003
onwards, would not contribute greatly to a
reduction in fiscal imbalances. Instead, given
the structural nature of fiscal deficits,
substantial budgetary reforms appear to be
needed to achieve ambitious consolidation
targets (including greater fiscal transparency,
increased efficiency and less mandatory
expenditures). The implementation of
consolidation plans, however, may be further
complicated owing to strong social preferences
in central European acceding countries for
retaining the welfare state. On the other hand,
there is in most cases no room to undertake cuts
in public investment, given the challenges
outlined.
At a country level, fiscal imbalances are most
profound in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Malta, Poland and Slovakia, with deficits well
above the 3% of GDP threshold (see Chart 41).
Hungary has the highest deficit, which stood at
9.2% of GDP in 2002 after almost doubling
from 4.7% of GDP in 2001. Moreover, it
should be noted that in some of the other
acceding countries, fiscal deficits are presently
not far below or are at the 3% threshold, namely
in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. The fiscal
accounts of Latvia and Lithuania are moreover
profiting, to some extent, from strong growth
performance. While fiscal challenges are
particularly pronounced for countries that are
currently registering high imbalances, it should
not be overlooked that containing deficits will
be a demanding task in the other acceding
countries as well, given the expenditure
pressures and the need to reduce high tax
burdens. Temporary increases in budget deficits
to accommodate such demands may easily turn
into more permanent imbalances, unless strong
and coherent medium-term fiscal frameworks
are in place.
Concerns that targeting a fast adoption of the
euro may lead some acceding countries to
follow a sub-optimal path of fiscal
consolidation are related to a scenario in which
fiscal consolidation in high-deficit countries
would stall while current target dates for euro
adoption would be retained, so that a massive
fiscal correction would have to be undertaken in
a short period of time a few years down the line.
In this context, it should also be borne in mind
that upon EU accession, new entrants should
bring their deficits well below the 3% threshold
Chart 41 General government budget
targets 2002-2006
(as a percentage of GDP)
Source: 2003 Pre-accession Economic Programmes.


























and move towards cyclically adjusted fiscal
positions close to balance in the medium term to
increase the room for manoeuvre in terms of
fiscal policy. Only under such circumstances
would fiscal policy become an important
adjustment tool for smoothing the business
cycle after joining the euro area. This would be
particularly relevant for catching-up economies,
given the potential for pronounced cyclical
fluctuations in these countries.60
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This paper has reviewed the exchange rate and
monetary integration strategies announced by
acceding countries for the period immediately
after EU entry, with a special focus on
participation in ERM II, and on their intentions
concerning the adoption of the euro at a later
stage. As this study aims at exploring key
issues at stake, outside the framework of any
surveillance procedure and convergence
examination, this paper has benefited from
several different approaches, including a short
review of nominal convergence and a more
extensive optimum currency area perspective.
An important aspect of the analysis has been
devoted to the implications of real convergence
– i.e. catching-up growth in income and
adjustment of the real economic structures
towards those prevailing in the euro area – on
the patterns of economic dynamics in acceding
countries. The fact that per capita income levels
are substantially below those in the euro area,
and that some segments of the structure of the
real sectors are still affected by the transition
process, are among the key economic
characteristics of acceding countries. While
different income levels can be, in principle,
compatible within a monetary union, such real
convergence may imply differences in economic
dynamics – including the level of growth and
the magnitude of fluctuations – that could make
a single monetary policy inappropriate for some
countries. Other aspects covered are the risks
for external competitiveness in the convergence
process and the appropriate pace of fiscal
consolidation.
Notwithstanding the preliminary nature of the
analysis, the complexity of the underlying issue
and the fact that theory is in many aspects
inconclusive with regard to optimum currency
areas and monetary integration, the following
tentative findings emerge from a comprehensive
investigation based on a wide set of economic
indicators.
The acceding countries display some
commonalities with the euro area that may bode
well for future monetary integration. In terms of
broad sectors, the economic structures of
acceding countries have become similar to those
of the euro area. Furthermore, the degree of
openness is high, and trade as well as financial
integration with the EU is well advanced in
most cases. At the same time, the paper finds
significant differences among the acceding
countries in terms of a range of nominal, real
and structural conditions. This pertains, in
particular, to labour market features, policy
interest rates, external positions and fiscal
performance. Moreover, the degree of
integration and cyclical harmonisation with the
euro area also differs considerably from
country to country. Against this background,
the paper supports the view that the economic
merits of any particular strategy towards ERM
II and the later adoption of the euro will need a
careful case-by-case assessment.
For some acceding countries, maintaining
exchange rate flexibility for some time after EU
accession may be important from a cyclical
stabilisation viewpoint. In such countries,
retaining exchange rate flexibility can make a
valuable contribution to smoothening output
volatility, especially if GDP developments
display substantial fluctuations, as tends to be
the case for countries that have embarked on a
dynamic catching-up process. It should be
noted that the standard fluctuation band of
ERM II would seem to give considerable room
for exchange rate variability and, thus, for a use
of the exchange rate as a tool for cyclical
stabilisation.
Whether it is preferable to maintain a degree of
exchange rate flexibility within ERM II or
outside this mechanism depends on a number of
factors and thus on the specific situation of
individual countries. Two important aspects in
this context are the monetary and exchange rate
framework in place and the fiscal performance.
For instance, countries that currently rely on a
monetary policy strategy based on a domestic
anchor would need to switch to a combination of
a domestic and external anchor when joining
ERM II, if they choose to maintain such domestic
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anchors. If and where such frameworks work
well, there may be good reasons to retain them
for some time after EU entry.
A more gradual approach towards ERM II
participation pertains to countries that are
currently facing high fiscal imbalances. In these
cases, achieving a critical mass of fiscal
consolidation and putting a credible medium-
term fiscal strategy in place should precede
ERM II entry in order to promote a smooth
participation in the mechanism. Furthermore,
choosing the optimal path of fiscal
consolidation – in particular in a post-transition
and EU accession context – may not be fully
consistent with the targeting of a fast adoption
of the euro.
Further monetary integration shall be facilitated
in countries where fiscal deficits and public
debt are limited, stability-oriented policies are
fully maintained and further structural policies
are implemented appropriately in order to
support the specific economic setting. Labour
market flexibility also remains crucial to adjust
to possible differences in economic conditions.
For acceding countries where these conditions
are in place, ERM II participation may turn out
to be comparatively limited in time, provided
that the consistency of domestic macroeconomic
policies and the sustainability of convergence in
general are fully preserved.
Nevertheless, in this context, several important
caveats have to be made. Even if, for a given
country, prima facie evidence at the current
juncture would seem to support the case for
maintaining the current exchange rate regime, it
would be premature to draw conclusions about
the country’s readiness for membership in ERM
II and for a subsequent adoption of the euro.
Moreover, the choice of the central parity
within ERM II is a key issue, as decisions in
this regard will be taken by mutual agreement of
the participating members in ERM II, including
the ECB. In addition, even if only minor
exchange rate regime changes are required in
some cases for participation in ERM II, a
potential misalignment in these countries is a
risk that cannot be ignored. More generally, the
absence of significant foreign exchange market
pressure in the past cannot be taken as implying
an absence of such pressure in the future.
These analytical findings are very preliminary,
as the paper offers above all a conceptual
framework designed to review the acceding
countries’ strategies towards ERM II and the
adoption of the euro. This does not therefore
preclude that the analysis will evolve, as it is
refined over time and takes account of new
economic developments and changing policy
stances in the acceding countries.62
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